


'Although Marcos was well aware of the economic restrictions, the public was not.'

'Marcos was swallowing his IMF-World Bank medicine in private.'



Cesar Virata- Technocrat Under Fire

By NANCY ROCAMORA

Is Ferdinand Marcos about to engineer a cabinet shake-up? Are top-level government officials about to resign en masse? Is there a crisis in the Philippine ruling coalition?

Nothing in reality, it turns out, quite matches the rumors wafted overseas from Manila coffeeshops. But things are stirring within the Philippine cabinet, the Executive Committee and Marcos' political party, the *Kilusang Bagong Lipunan* (New Society Party). World Bank bashing has become a sudden new sport and none other than mild-mannered Cesar Virata, Finance Minister and Prime Minister, today stands at the center of a swirling controversy.

Once again Marcos the master dictator is at work, orchestrating domestic controversy to make political points abroad. This time he hopes to force the master lending institution to ease up a bit on its strict policies. The targets of the current wave of outrage are not only the institution itself and its sidekick the International Monetary Fund, but their chief representatives at home, Virata and the other technocrats known as the "World Bank Cabinet."

It all began in April. In the midst of a regular meeting

of the KBL caucus, a chorus of outrage at the World Bank and the technocrats erupted. Mrs. Marcos opened the attack bemoaning the fact that insufficient funds for her *Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran* program have been released.

Sugar magnate Roberto Benedicto quickly picked up the ball denouncing restrictions on the Philippine economy by the World Bank—IMF combine. He accused the twin agencies of international capital of violating Philippine sovereignty. "Let us fight the IMF if necessary," he thundered.

Labor Secretary Blas Ople soon jumped into the fray, nailing Virata—openly viewed as the World Bank's agent in the Philippine Cabinet—for making government economic policy singlehandedly. He later offered a joking suggestion that perhaps it was time for Virata to step down.

As to Ferdinand Marcos, what he did not do was more remarkable than anything he did. He did not accept Virata's offer of resignation. Neither did he do anything to stop the controversy. In fact, he added his own understated fuel to the fire, insisting, according to one Manila radio station, that "government contracts should not be thrown to the president in the manner in which they are now being referred to his office without any explanation as to the details" Ferdinand

Marcos was playing coy. And the rumors were rolling.

Much of the discontent reflects the widely felt frustration and anger over the dreadful state of the Philippine economy. Generous sources claim a growth figure for 1982 of 2.5%. International prices of the Philippines' traditional exports, coconut, copper and sugar, only began to pick up slightly this year from their rock-bottom low, but not enough to make a difference. Many companies went belly-up last year and

Continued on page 6

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Watch Out for a Tonkin in Nicaragua

According to CIA Director William Casey, the U.S. intends to see the Sandinistas overthrown before the end of the year. Casey's timetable of course, reflects the Reagan administration's will to reverse its deteriorating position in Central America by increased military means. As a wish, it originates from the U.S. rulers' strategic fears about Managua's threat to the future of U.S. dominance in the region. Timetable, wish, or both, Casey's statement highlights the heightened possibility of a direct U.S. war on Nicaragua.

After the Cuban revolution, the U.S. vowed "never again" to let any nation in this hemisphere break from its hold. It was successful in bloodily suppressing Allende socialism in Chile, but was outfoxed by the Nicaraguan revolution—hence its vengefulness at the Sandinistas. But America's consuming anger is at bottom fueled by the aim of preventing "Cuban-style" socialism from taking root right in the Central American isthmus, where the various peoples are already visibly tired of the injustices bred by the U.S.-sponsored oligarchies. Also, the White House wants to use Managua as an object lesson for those peoples and their revolutionary movements. Its message: even if you win, we won't allow you to sleep peacefully.

These reasons underlie the U.S. policy of economic blockade, sabotage, attempting to split the FSLN directorate, and funding the fascist "contras" now euphemistically called "freedom fighters" by Reagan himself. But the ultimate prescription for a Sandinista defeat is perhaps the plan voiced by Secretary of Defense

Caspar Weinberger: "an air and sea quarantine that would require large numbers of American troops, aircraft and vessels."


However, to launch this "D-Day," Reagan needs an excuse strong enough to overcome the Vietnam syndrome that presently blocks public support for direct U.S. troop involvement in Central America. He is, therefore, searching everywhere to beg, steal or borrow a Gulf of Tonkin incident that would unleash the dogs of intervention on the fledgling Sandinista government. He has tried and failed with White Papers, aerial photos of purported Soviet and Cuban arms and bases in Nicaragua, flimsy proof of Sandinista intrusions in El Salvador, etc. He has not stopped trying.

More recently, the U.S. heightened its antagonism with Nicaragua. Reacting to the expulsion of three of its embassy personnel caught engaging in covert activity in Nicaragua, Reagan ordered the closure of six Nicaraguan consular offices in the U.S. and expelled over 20 Nicaraguan consular officials.

Other attempts to slander the Sandinista government include spurious accounts of Sandinista "anti-Semitism" (perhaps also meant to diffuse criticisms of Israeli arms sales and training for Honduras). But Washington's biggest ploy is to provoke Nicaraguan troops to cross the borders into Honduras and Costa Rica, by directing "contras" based in these countries to intensify their attacks. Should the Sandinistas pursue these marauders across the borders, the White House would have the chance to cry "Aggression!" and set in motion its quarantine-cum-invasion plan. Whatever the scenario, Reagan wants an excuse and wants it bad.


Implied by all this is the President's belief that the widespread sentiment against intervention is not based on an intelligent appraisal of who is the real villain in Central America. Therefore, it is not immune to cynical maneuvers. The emerging question is whether the American public will prove him wrong. The Nicaraguans and a lot of other people would really like to know. □

1981 CUBAN EXODUS TO U.S.



WELCOME! ALL YE FREEDOM-SEEKERS!

1983



HEY, AHFFF... EHHHH... ERRR... FIDEL... UHHH... YOU GOT SOME... GULLLLL... HOMESICK BRETHREN HERE...



Cynthia Maglaya, KDP Co-Founder and Revolutionary—1947-1983

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ANG KATIPUNAN

A socialist periodical for the Filipino community

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Litter from Manila



By INIDORO DELIHENCIA

Ambassador Kokoy

The First Lady's brother, Ambassador Kokoy Romualdez is proving himself as a diplomat. He headed the Philippine panel in the recently concluded U.S. bases talks here. I asked him how he fared and he said, "I pressed the Americans hard on the sovereignty issue, but they just wouldn't give me PX privilege. Then they asked me what cosmetic changes we would like in who has jurisdiction over the bases. I said no lipstick and just a little eye-liner. Then I really hit them hard on "joint supervision"—no way would I let those strip joints and beer joints in Olongapo and Angeles go unsupervised." I told Kokoy he really has come of age as a negotiator. "Doroy naman," he said, "I'm not that old." I think the other members of the Philippine panel

were sworn to secrecy about the details of the talks. When I asked one of them whether at any point Kokoy had difficulty making up his mind, the guy just looked at me blankly and said, "What mind?"

News item: "President Marcos said the government could wipe out subversives in the country within a month but it would be accused of genocide if it did so." Nothing could be further from the truth. To really wipe out the dissidents, we would have to sink the whole island of Samar, cut-off Northern Luzon and let it drift out to sea, raze everything and everyone in Central Luzon then transplant it with folks from Batac, flood many provinces in Mindanao and poison parts of Manila. But FM's hands are tied. Right now, he is only wiping out a few barrios here and there, but everyone is already crying "massacre." He really can't please everyone.

How many Prime Ministers does it take to screw up the economy? One, if it's Cesar Virata. He is now under attack by friends of the President because no one knows if his loyalty is to the government or to the World Bank. At a time when this lender is intent on collecting, we defaulting borrowers should unite because we are all Filipinos. I always knew Virata was overrated. Did you know that he only has an M.A. in Economics and no

Ph.D? Also, I don't trust anyone who can't deliver an extemporaneous speech. Virata has to write down what he will say before he can order from a waiter. When I saw him doing this at the Hilton in 1979, I knew right then we were going to have inflation in 1980, recession in 1982, defaults on loans in 1983 and high unemployment all the way. I say to FM: fire him now before he orders lunch.

There is no truth to the rumor Gen.Fabian Ver and Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile hate each other's guts.

There is no truth to the rumor that the First Lady hates Imee and Tommy Manotoc's baby's guts.

Irene Marcos is marrying Gregg Araneta of the Hertz Rent-A-Car, Phil. fortune. The NPA does not have to do a kidnapping for this one. The President is really happy about the whole thing. Speaking of weddings, the President and the First Lady renewed their vows for the 29th time in a touching ceremony officiated by that Cardinal Sin. FM told his gathered friends that for him "friendship comes first before wealth." CDCP magnate Rodolfo Cuenca swears FM was being sincere, "You know, before I became wealthy I first had to be a friend of his," he said. □

A MARRIAGE SO CONVENIENT

U.S.-R.P. Bases Accords

Two new agreements between the U.S. and the Philippines, signed and released little more than a week apart indicate an upgrading and intensification of military ties between the U.S. and the government of Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

The two-pronged military package includes a draft joint defense plan for the Philippines produced under the auspices of the U.S.-R.P. Mutual Defense Treaty and signed the third week of May. Shortly after this was announced, on May 31 negotiators unveiled the long-awaited U.S.-R.P. Military Bases Agreement.

Together the two pacts promise stepped-up U.S. commitment to the regime of Ferdinand Marcos, both through increased military aid and through new mechanisms for potential U.S. troop involvement should insurgency get beyond Marcos' control.

The new bases agreement came about without formal negotiations and was the product of private discussions which had gone on since April. The absence of the conventional public debate was a clear indication to observers that the two parties were in fundamental agreement over all issues at stake.

The product of this behind-the-scenes haggling tries to satisfy the diplomatic needs of the Marcos regime as well as its request for larger compensation for the use of the areas covered by Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. It calls for \$900 million in military and economic aid and offers a number of concessions to the sensitive Philippine sovereignty issue, such as the upping of the Philippine base commander's status. Finally, the agreement establishes a joint U.S.-R.P. committee to oversee its implementation.


The \$900 million represents a significant increase over the \$500 million offered in 1979, at the same time falling considerably short of the \$1.5 billion Marcos had hoped for. This aid package breaks down into \$425 million in military aid and \$475 million in so called "economic" aid. \$300 million comes in the form of foreign military sales credits for which the Philippine government will pay at low treasury interest rates over a 30-year period. Another \$125 million goes directly to the Philippine armed forces as a grant.

The remaining \$475 million is billed as economic grants to finance energy projects, irrigation work, schools, public markets, and slaughterhouses. But, observers here point out, much of this aid ties neatly into the Philippine military's counterinsurgency plans. Local officials from 19 towns surrounding Clark and Subic met with the Philippines' chief negotiator Ambassador Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez shortly before the agreement was signed. The group discussed projects designed to ameliorate the social effects of the bases on their communities. Together they drew up 58 projects costing \$25.5 million to be funded out of the bases aid package. Not so coincidentally, a number of those towns are known strongholds of the New People's Army.

Much of the remaining \$450 million will serve military purposes beyond the bases areas. U.S. State and Defense Department officials testifying last February before the House Foreign Affairs Committee emphasized that the poor economic conditions in the countryside provide fertile ground for NPA recruitment and expansion.

A sizable portion of the bases aid is thus designed to fund the economic or civic action component of the Philippine military's "Project *Katatagan* (Stabilization)."

"*Katatagan*," unveiled in December of 1982, is the counterinsurgency brainchild of Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff Fabian Ver and former U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci. The program aims to streamline and professionalize the Philippine military and isolate the NPA from its base. Aside from uprooting civilians from NPA areas and transplanting them in "strategic hamlets," the program calls for "winning the hearts and minds of the Filipino people." The aid package thus provides the necessary cash component to undertake these Vietnam War-era "civic action" programs.



Even Washington understands the need of a Third World leader to appear minimally independent while housing the hub of America's Asia-Pacific activities. Thus, the new agreement makes several concessions on the ticklish question of Philippine sovereignty. The 1979 agreement called for Filipino as well as U.S. commanders for Clark and Subic. The figurehead commander, however was not even allowed inside the bases and the public remained nearly oblivious to his existence.

The current agreement allows the Filipino commander and his representatives access to the areas he allegedly command, except those where secret equipment and information are kept. The areas will eventually be open to inspection through "procedures still to be determined."

More concretely, the new agreement will allow the Bureau of Internal Revenue to collect withholding taxes on the salaries of Filipino base workers which the regime hopes will generate P35 million annually. The agreement also refers to new arrangements concerning customs, immigration and quarantine matters. On the nagging issue of GIs who commit crimes while stationed in the Philippines, the Marcos regime, however drew a blank. The most the U.S. would concede was a blanket pledge that all servicemen stationed in the Philippines "are to respect Philippine laws."

The accord establishes a joint committee to oversee implementation and regularize consultation over bases-related matters. This committee will supplement the workings of the already existing Mutual Defense Board, the body charged with implementing the Mutual Defense Treaty and finalizing a joint defense plan. Observers see these two bodies as an answer to one of Marcos' key demands during the negotiating process. While the previous agreement sanctioned the use of U.S. troops for "off-base security operations," the Philippine dictator was hoping for a firmer guarantee of direct U.S. involvement in Philippine counterinsurgency.

From the U.S. perspective, this was hardly unreasonable. Insurgency in the Philippines is already as much a concern of Ronald Reagan as of Ferdinand Marcos. Alvin Cotrell, maritime specialist with Georgetown University put it very bluntly at a CIA-sponsored conference last September: "even a mildly nationalistic government" might not cooperate over the bases. His point—Marcos must be supported at all costs, even if it means intervention.

Prior to the new agreement, mechanisms were already being put in place for just such a contingency. In February of 1982, Bataan residents reported that "off-base security operations" extended as far as their province. U.S. marines had been deployed to the Samal area to take over for Philippine marines sent elsewhere to fight the NPA.

Meanwhile, U.S. military aid to the Marcos regime consists almost exclusively of counterinsurgency weaponry. This includes the infamous Huey Bell UH-1 helicopter used to devastating effect during the Vietnam War. Other items include F5-E Tiger jets, M-113 armed personnel carriers and, most recently, OV-10 aircraft used by the Indonesian armed forces to quash the independence movement in East Timor.

"Project *Katatagan*" is another part of the picture. The regular consultations within the Board and committee will regularize the process through which Ver and Carlucci developed the counterinsurgency strategy. Ver co-chairs the board. Committee members have not yet been announced.

Opposition to the bases is long-standing in the Philippines. Within the last several months, human rights activists, students, teachers, consumer activists, and politicians have organized the Anti-Bases Coalition to demand their removal. Led by former senators Jose Diokno and Lorenzo Tañada, they held several demonstrations before the U.S. Embassy last April.

The ABC condemns the U.S. bases as a violation of Philippine sovereignty and as springboards for intervention into the internal affairs of other nations. It sees them as a provocation which might draw the Philippines into conflict with other nations with whom it has no quarrel.

Furthermore, the ABC sees the bases and the strategic role they play in U.S. defense strategy as the single most important justification for continued U.S. support of dictator Marcos. Finally, the ABC fears that the bases make the Philippines a target for nuclear attack by the Soviet Union.

The Soviets themselves are clearly disturbed by this contention which comes from Ferdinand Marcos as well as the opposition movement. A delegation visiting Manila last March insisted that the Philippines is not a target for attack. This was consistent with their broader pledge, they said, not to strike first with nuclear weapons anywhere. The delegation was no doubt concerned that, if the threat of nuclear holocaust were the main reason for opposing the bases, the Soviets would end up sharing the blame for the U.S.' wrongdoing. True enough, "anti-bases" pro-Marcos publications began calling the Soviet disclaimers "usual communist lies."

Both military bases no doubt store nuclear warheads and pens (in Subic) for servicing nuclear submarines. But the American nuclear umbrella is projected principally from launch areas in the U.S. and Europe. While providing a chilling threat to world survival, the nuclear umbrella is principally calculated to intimidate and provide the U.S. sufficient leverage to continue fighting conventional warfare worldwide.

The Clark/Subic axis represents a logistical hub for just such conventional warfare. Subic, the largest U.S. naval installation outside the country, is one of the two forward positions for the U.S. 7th Fleet. It is the largest and most comprehensive support facility available in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific regions.

The U.S. Naval Magazine at Subic stores, services and distributes ammunition and explosives to all units of the 7th Fleet. Sixty percent of all Fleet repair work occurs at Subic which also serves as homeport for Task Force 77, an attack carrier force periodically deployed to the Indian Ocean.

Clark Air Base functions as logistical and communications center for U.S. Air Force traffic in the Western Pacific and between the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Clark is home to the U.S. 13th Air Force, consisting of two squadrons of F-4 Phantom fighter-

Continued on page 5



Former senator Jose Diokno spoke June 6 before a San Francisco audience on the role of the U.S. bases in the Philippines. Diokno, strong critic of the bases and spokesperson for the Anti-Bases Coalition, is on a four-city U.S. tour sponsored by the Campaign Against Military Intervention in the Philippines.

Regime Harassed by NPA Strength

"Our reading as military professionals is we are losing the fight and this is true on practically all fronts where the dissidents choose to operate," observed an unnamed retired officer of the pre-Marcos military to the *Bulletin Today* last April.

Increasing reports of clashes between government troops and the New People's Army are becoming almost daily reminders of the guerillas' growing muscle and are placing President Ferdinand Marcos on the defensive.

Successful NPA operations have been reported most recently in the provinces of Surigao and Misamis Oriental, and in Abra in the northern part of the country.

BATTALION COMMANDER KILLED

On March 19, 30 NPA killed two army officers, including a battalion commander, and two soldiers in an ambush along the newly-constructed Iligan-Cagayan de Oro-Butuan Highway in Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental. A few days later, six soldiers were killed when guerillas attacked a Philippine Constabulary headquarters in Baranggay Aras-asan, Kagwait, Surigao del Sur. The attackers took all the materiel in the headquarters' supply room.

On April 12, 60 NPA took over the Paper Industry Corporation of the Philippines for 18 hours in Baranggay Cabugawen, Sinatuan, Surigao del Norte. No one was harmed. In Guinalaban, Salay, Misamis Oriental, a band of NPA fighters ambushed a military communication team, killing two Air Force officers and two constabulary soldiers.

In the Davao area, the government's recently deployed 7,000 troops were unable to stop a guerilla attack on a benefit dance held in Baranggay Tiblawan, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental. The guerilla unit left a municipal station commander and five of his men dead.

PRIESTS LEAD ABRA ATTACKS
In a three-pronged ambush, a unit of NPA fighters in the northern province of Abra killed 12 government men including a PC captain and a lieutenant last April. In Tubo, Abra, two NPA priests, Fr. Bruno Ortega and Fr. Jovencio Balweg

led an attack on the city hall April 12. On the same day, five PC troopers were killed by a band of NPA in Baranggay Nabaan, Bucloc, Abra. Fr. Jovencio Balweg is the brother of Conrado Balweg, another priest-turned-NPA who is being hunted down by the Marcos regime.

DEFENSIVE RESPONSE; OFFENSIVE TACTICS

The NPA is obviously "getting desperate," claimed Ferdinand Marcos in an attempt to explain away the bold and well-coordinated character of the recent guerilla activities. On the other hand, the Association of Retired Generals and Flag Officers was vocal in its criticism of the discipline, morale and combat effectiveness of the Marcos military.


In response, Marcos told the press, "We are liquidating the enemy." Commemorating the anniversary of the Philippine Army, he announced hundreds of NPA surrenders and claimed that over 800 NPA had been killed in 1983.

These claims were echoed by Armed Forces Chief of Staff Fabian Ver who claimed they were a result of his Project *Katatagan* (Stability) launched last December 31. (See story, page 1.)

As part of this program, on March 22, Ver reactivated the famous Army Ranger regiment that broke the back of the Huk uprising in the 1950s. The 1,500-men regiment, composed of five scout ranger companies, two ranger battalions, and a mountaineering battalion and commanded by Brig. Gen. Felix Broner is designed specifically for fighting guerillas in Mindanao and other remote parts of the country.

STREAMLINING AND PROFESSIONALIZING

Other efforts to streamline and professionalize the military under *Katatagan* include the recently announced plan to create AFP regional unified commands in four of the country's 13 regions. All armed forces operating units and their respective leaders, including the PC regional command will report to RUC commanders. The new plan aims to maximize battle efficiency and eliminate unnecessary intervention from headquarters. □



Buod ng mga Balita

FM, NAKASONE SWAP HUGS

Japanese Premier Yasuhiro Nakasone arrived in Manila for a three-day visit in May, greeted by a 21-gun salute, a receiving line of Philippine cabinet members and other top officials. The lavish greeting was a clear indication that the tension which has characterized Japanese-Philippine relations the past 37 years is over.

On paper, the visit accomplished relatively little. Nakasone promised that Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund will lend \$231 million for nine projects next year, and an increase of 11% over last year. However, he refused to reduce tariffs on Philippine bananas or to subsidize the \$1.2 billion San Roque Dam. To Marcos' further disappointment, Tokyo declined to subsidize the Philippines' wavering copper industry of which Japan is the largest customer.

But the Nakasone visit was not really about copper, bananas, dams or loans. Symbolically, Nakasone's gesture reflected a renewal of political ties and the potential for a military alliance.

Upon his arrival, Nakasone gave an explanation of Japan's increasing military role in the region. He stressed that improvements in R.P.-Japan relations would be crucial for Asia's stability. Likewise, Marcos viewed the visit as "an opportunity to achieve fresh understanding and respect," adding that "we should be wise" to defend our relationships against any problems.

Concluding his 12-day visit of ASEAN countries, Nakasone's visit here represents Japan's campaign to firm up its economic influence and its drive to become a military factor in the region—a role it is undertaking at

U.S. prodding. U.S. military strategy for the region calls for stepped-up Japanese participation in the job of restraining liberation movements and in any confrontation with the Soviet Union.

For Japan, mending political relations with the Philippines and other ASEAN countries has not been easy. Anti-Japanese sentiments burn strongly among Filipinos, mainly due to the atrocities committed by Japanese fascism during World War II. Ferdinand Marcos, under the pressure of popular anti-Japanese sentiments, dutifully made his public statement of concern over Japan's re-armament. However, Marcos has always been aware of the importance the U.S. places on Japan's potential role in Southeast Asia. Thus, the red carpet was ready and waiting—for Nakasone's historic visit. □

SAN MIG BREWING TIES WITH MARCOS

In its annual shareholders' meeting last May 10, San Miguel Corporation, the nation's biggest private sector corporation and diversified manufacturing concern, sent shock waves through the business community. SMC approved an investment of up to P500 million (\$50 million) in the United Coconut Planters Bank and, at the same time, elected UCPB President Eduardo Cojuangco as vice-chairman of San Miguel.

SMC has traditionally been owned and run by the interrelated Spanish Soriano, Ayala and Roxas families. Recently a squabble broke out between cousins, SMC Chairman Andres Soriano and then Vice-Chairman Enrique Zobel over "differences in management style."

Zobel ultimately resigned from the board and sold his holdings of 19% of the company's shares.

San Miguel, whose beer is world famous, remained one of the few successful businesses in the Philippines outside the clutches of Ferdinand Marcos or his cronies. For a number of years, Marcos, through front-man John Gokongwei, attempted to gain controlling interest of the lucrative concern but to no avail. The Soriano-Zobel alliance was impenetrable and together the Spaniards controlled too much stock to allow an outsider significant headway.

All that changed when Zobel sold his 19% to Venture Securities Corp., a cover for UCPB. The bank's board chairman is none other than Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. Together, Enrile and Cojuangco control the country's entire coconut industry and are among the most important presidential cronies.

UCPB, which is technically a private commercial bank owned by the country's coconut farmers, is tied very closely to the Marcos government. Enrile and Cojuangco sit on the boards of major government agencies, industry associations and institutions that control the Philippines' coconut industry.

SMC's growth and stability have made it a favorite among shareholders big and small. Its revenues climbed from P930 million in 1972 to P5.8 billion in 1982, its profits from P73 million to P305 million.

Bringing San Miguel into the regime's fold represents a major coup for the regime. At the same time, the new alliance—the Philippines' biggest business alliance in decades, creates interesting new political possibilities.

Enrile is one of the key contenders for Marcos' position once he steps down or becomes incapacitated. Soriano, previously apolitical, is one of the giants of the business world. The Enrile-Soriano axis certainly gives the Defense Minister added clout. Score one for Enrile. □

Secret Decrees, Court Rulings

TIGHTENING THE SCREWS

By ROMY GARCIA
and NENE OJEDA

The government of Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos dropped its most repressive bombshell to date last May 16. Writings or speeches which "tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities" are punishable by death. Political opponents of the Marcos government, including those living abroad, can be tried in absentia.

These alarming provisions are included in two secret presidential decrees, PD 1834 and 1835, released to the Supreme Court on that date. Intended to cow government oppositionists in and out of the Philippines, both decrees were signed January 16, 1981, one day before martial law was "lifted."

The revelation of the secret decrees followed a one-two punch from the Supreme Court aimed to paralyze the opposition. Two recent decisions grant Marcos absolute power to order the arrest, detention, and release of subversion suspects and more or less write the already enfeebled Philippine judiciary altogether out of the picture.

DEATH TO RALLY PARTICIPANTS, PUBLISHERS

Under PD 1834, death awaits anyone convicted of crimes against the government, the definition of which has been significantly broadened. This includes organizers of public rallies and labor pickets and even mere participants. Publishers who allow their facilities to be used in "sustained propaganda assaults" can be convicted for sedition and condemned to death. The decree amends the Penal Code provision for rebellion, which called for six month jail sentences for most political crimes.

PD 1834 meanwhile authorized trials in absentia for those charged with subversion and empowers the government to confiscate their properties in the Philippines. This has direct implications for the U.S.-based opposition to the Marcos dictatorship, many of whom, including the editor of this paper, have been formally charged with rebellion in the Philippine courts.

The two laws were made public after the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) filed for the publication of the more than 1,000 presidential decrees and orders they believed issued by Marcos in the last 10 years.

Its disclosure also followed twin Supreme Court rulings last April denying judicial review and bail to those arrested

for subversion under presidential orders. The new rulings were the result of two separate cases seeking writ of habeas corpus from the country's highest judicial body.

ABSOLUTE POWER TO MARCOS FOR ARRESTS, RELEASES


The first, heard on April 20 was a petition filed on behalf of 14 people arrested in Bayumbong, Nueva Vizcaya last year and currently detained in an undisclosed place. No criminal charges have been filed against them. The court ruled that the Presidential Commitment Order under which the petitioners were arrested was a legal and valid arrest warrant and not subject to judicial review. PCOs replaced the Arrest Search and Seizure Orders of the martial law years and can be issued only by Marcos himself.

The April 26 court decision meanwhile dismissed another petition for the writ filed by Horacio Morales and Antonio Moncupa seeking bail and a speedy, public trial. The court cited PD 2045 which lifted martial law in 1981 but suspended the writ of habeas corpus in certain areas and for certain people for "reasons of national security and public order."

The president alone, the court claimed, by virtue of his decree, can determine when the security of the country is at stake and when to use emergency powers to avert danger. Bail has been denied both petitioners who have been linked to the National Democratic Front.

WRITING OFF THE JUDICIARY

The two rulings in effect represent total acquiescence to the arbitrary character of



the Marcos government by the nation's highest judiciary body. The Supreme Court has, in the past, denied the writ to political prisoners on a case-to-case basis.

But the latest decision render any further appeal to the judiciary branch pointless and, in effect, recognizes that there is only one branch to the Philippine government—the Executive.

The court's fiat, in fact, legalizes what is already in effect. Many who have been acquitted in court trials or have completed sentences for political offenses remain detained because Marcos has never issued the PCOs to order their release.

TARGET: FEER

Both the secret decrees and the Supreme Court decisions are part of the regime's onslaught, an all-sided attack against the opposition launched ten months ago. Its most recent target has been the media, first local and now foreign.

On May 4, the Pasay City Court of First Instance issued an arrest warrant for British editor Derek Davies and his Manila correspondent Sheila Ocampo-Kalfors of the *Far Eastern Economic Review*. The respected Hong Kong-based weekly has been sued for ₱20 million in a criminal libel suit filed by Brig. Gen. Salvador Mison of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Eastern Command.

The suit stems from a story published April 20, 1981 concerning the alleged Samuroy massacre, the shelling of a church full of parishioners by government troops.

The government claims the massacre never occurred and filed suit several months ago against the *Review*. Observers note, however, that the arrest warrants are a highly unusual step for the government to take in a libel suit and consider the tactic intimidation directed at Ocampo who has produced the most consistent and balanced reporting on opposition matters of Manila-based foreign correspondents to date.

In another, less obvious move against the press, Marcos recently wrote a personal note to the *Bulletin Today*, the most widely circulated of Philippine dailies, defending his policies. In the course of the handwritten note, he slipped in certain references to the fact that *Bulletin Today* gives the widest coverage of all dailies to opposition rallies and other activities.

Coming from Marcos, observers noted, this could only be an indirect warning to tone down such coverage.

PRESS, OTHERS FIGHT BACK

The latest moves toward institutionalized repression did not go unnoticed. Human rights advocates, including retired Justice of the Supreme Court Cecilia Palma, May 20 called for a non-violent protest in an attempt to force Marcos to repeal the secret decrees.

Meanwhile, the press as an institution, has not been altogether idle. Members of the National Press Club meeting last May voted to the board Antonio Nieva and Jose Burgos.

Both men are recent victims of Marcos' attacks. Nieva, president of the Employees' Union of Major Philippine Daily Newspapers, was arrested for his ties with the *Kilusang Mayo Uno* (May First Movement—see story on page 7). Burgos is on trial for subversion, having won Marcos' ire for publishing a series of articles questioning the validity of his World War II medals. Nieva, the new NPC president and Burgos are currently under house arrest following detention.

The foreign media, quick to respond to any issue related to press freedom, gave the secret decree revelations broader coverage than Ferdinand Marcos must have expected. Editorials condemned the decrees, cartoonists had a grand time.

Marcos, clearly caught off guard, began quickly to backpedal. He had meant to intimidate the opposition, not become the target of public outrage abroad—particularly not while important negotiations with the U.S. were going on (see story, page 5).

In a speech before the Philippine Bar Association late in May, Marcos claimed that the unpublished decrees were not enforced anyway, save for one on illegal possession of firearms. He also issued a promise that he would not use his powers "to oppress" or "with tyrannical force."

But the Supreme Court had already abrogated whatever judicial check it may once have had and accorded the president absolute power. The only person left on the scene to determine just what "tyranny" was none other than Ferdinand Marcos—and that was cold comfort to the opposition. □

U.S. Bases

Continued from page 3

bombers, a squadron of T-38s and one of F-5s for specialized air combat training and a squadron of C-130 carriers and helicopters of the Military Aircraft Command. The Crow Valley Range provides the most sophisticated Air Force training facilities anywhere in Asia.

Clark and Subic served as an all-purpose support facility and refuelling station during the Vietnam War. In addition, they provided R&R, hospital and mortuary services for thousands of GIs.

Together, the two bases possess the military and logistical capacity to project U.S. military power throughout the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Former Clark Commander Freddie Poston boasted to newsmen several years ago that he could have planes in southern Africa within 12 hours during an internal crisis. Clark also serves as a vital refuelling station on the backdoor route to Israel.

In more recent years, ships based at Subic have been

dispatched to hover threateningly off the coast of Iran and later Afghanistan during periods of internal struggle. Here they provided not-so-subtle warnings of potential U.S. intervention. Only two months ago, planes based at Clark flew howitzers and surface-to-air missiles to Thailand to assist in the renewed fighting at the Thai-Cambodian border.

Although the bases may not be vital to U.S. nuclear war plans, the progressive movement has ample reason to want them out. Clark and Subic draw the Philippines into U.S. attempts to crush national liberation struggles throughout a wide portion of the world. They provide a direct threat of U.S. intervention in the Philippine national liberation struggle itself. Finally, by providing dictator Marcos with an iron-clad guarantee of U.S. support—without which he would fall rather quickly—they remain the greatest obstacle to human rights in the Philippines today.

Anti-Marcos groups within the U.S. are working to oppose the bases and demand their removal. As part of that effort, Diokno recently toured U.S. cities speaking on the subject beginning with his San Francisco talk on June 6.

But it will be an uphill battle. The Reagan administration has learned well the effectiveness of the term "national security." Even the most ardent liberals, and the most vocal supporters of human rights in Congress waffle when told that a loss of the Philippine bases would threaten U.S. national security. The greatest concession they are likely to entertain is to move the bases to another site—Guam, the Marianas, Singapore, or Japan—and subject another people to precisely the same fate that Filipinos suffer today.

For the U.S. government hardliners, even this is out of the question. One military strategist, asked recently whether a "Guantanamo solution" was feasible in case of a victory by the revolutionary movement, rejected the possibility flat out. Such a victory would mean "reconquering and subsequently regoverning almost all of Luzon at least," he claimed.

It is an uphill battle for the movement in the Philippines as well. Not only does the ABC oppose a relationship vital to the survival of the current regime, it does so under conditions of fascism and a U.S. war drive on the international front. To demand a withdrawal of the bases within the U.S. is progressive; to do so in the Philippines is revolutionary. □

Virata Under Fire . . .

Continued from page 1

others would have done so but for massive infusions of government cash. International lending institutions last year seriously feared that the Philippines was about to default on its loans. Fortunately for Marcos, at the end of the year, the World Bank and IMF came across with emergency loans totalling \$843 million which prevented the government from going into default.

But World Bank-IMF money always comes with strings attached. After all, these twin institutions did not go into the business of making low-interest loans to underdeveloped countries for nothing. Their concern is to guide Third World development in a direction profitable for international capital.

Given the overall state of the Philippine economy, there were more strings than usual. While the IMF-World Bank demanded austerity overall, particular strictures were placed on government funds used to bail out presidential cronies.

In fact, although the blame was being placed squarely on Virata, Ferdinand Marcos knew full well about the various restrictions and requirements. IMF Asia Division Chief Tun Thin called on him last October and secured the Philippine President's consent to key concessions including the reduction of the budget deficit to 2.4%. Although Marcos was well aware of the restrictions, the public was not. Marcos was swallowing his IMF-World Bank medicine in private.

Events have since conspired to reveal just how much these two powerful institutions dictate Philippine economic policy—far more than the Philippine public and even many Filipino politicians realized. The initial attack came in the form of the expose *Development Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines*. Published jointly in 1982 by the Institute for Food and Development Policy and Philippine Solidarity Network and authored by Walden Bello, David Kinley and Elaine Elinson, the study has made the once stodgy and uninteresting World Bank into a controversial institution.

Since the primary source for the book is 6,000 pages of World Bank documents, its conclusions are difficult to ignore. Reprinted in a Philippine edition, the book has been selling well both on the open and black markets. One unexpected market has been government officials and bureaucrats.

The government officials have hardly bought the book's analysis of the Bank's role in opening up the Philippines to foreign capital. Depending upon the faction to which they belong, they have reacted with either extreme defensiveness or pseudo-nationalist outrage. The outrage intensified last May when Bello along with the Philippine Support Committee and *Counterspy* magazine circulated the secret letter in which Virata and Central Bank Governor Jaime C. Laya bit the bullet and accepted the IMF's terms.

Those terms are pretty stiff. Virata and Laya agree to a 2% growth rate in order to hold the balance-of-payments deficit to \$600 million. Bail-out operations are to be halved as government "equity contributions and net lending" are to be cut by 50% and 43% respectively. Large-scale development projects are put on ice—in particular an aluminum smelter, an integrated pulp and paper project and a petro-chemical plant planned for this year or soon thereafter. Short-term borrowing is to be severely reduced.

In addition, the austerity measures demand budget cuts to bring government spending down to ₱52.9 billion and reduce the budget deficit to ₱9.4 billion, a sharp cut compared to last year's ₱14.4 billion. New taxes are to raise government revenues by 14%. This means a 3% tax on imports and taxes on liquor, beer and cigarettes. Power and energy rates are also to go up.


The revelations fell like sparks on dry tinder for they came at a time when the state of the economy was already creating unrest and dissatisfaction. Implementing the austerity plan may stir things up still further for it is going to hurt everyone a good deal before it helps—if it ever does.



Blas Ople



Imelda Marcos



Roberto Benedicto

Most acutely suffering from World Bank policies as executed by Virata over the past several years are Filipino workers and peasants. Their wages have objectively declined and land has been snatched away through the World Bank's recipe for Philippine development, export-led growth. Most recently, business closures meant increased unemployment.

The new measure will raise the costs of consumer goods through hikes in energy rates and taxes on imports. Austerity will mean that a number of the lowest level government employees—clerks and school-teachers in particular—will have their raises frozen or lose their jobs altogether.

The steady impoverishment of the Filipino people has of late been a cause of much concern to the business community which clearly sees the connection between economic hardship and expansion of the New People's Army. It is much distressed over the economy's continuing poor performance and its inability to pull out of the current slump. "People feel the bottom has been

current uproar as an opportunity for some useful political maneuvering.

A number of critics and commentators have expressed amusement, even irritation, over the amount of anger directed at the supposedly neutral World Bank from various quarters. But Ferdinand Marcos knows that the World Bank is anything but neutral. While serving as the international headquarters for technocracy, the World Bank remains a highly political institution dominated by the U.S., the strongest of capitalist nations.

The Reagan administration may have launched a campaign to rationalize development institutions and demand more businesslike dealings. But World Bank clients are precisely the regimes that the U.S. supports. A number of them are the "friendly authoritarian" states with which Reagan is busily firming up his political, military and economic ties. Marcos knows that, however sloppy his economy, the World Bank is not going to drop him like a hot potato.

The World Bank dilemma thus provides a clever dictator with a certain amount of leverage. A well-orchestrated chorus of public outrage just might be sufficient to do the trick and force this multilateral institution into giving an inch, easing up on its strictures.

The mild, unassuming and heretofore uncontroversial Cesar Virata is the inevitable target for the flak. The Prime Minister's role as the World Bank-Philippine government double agent is widely recognized. Virata's close ties to the bank enable him to wangle otherwise impossible loans for the Philippine government, while his responsible position in the Philippine cabinet acts as some kind of guarantee to the Bank that the government will follow its policies. The Marcos government and the World Bank each expects Virata to look out for its interests while dealing with the other.

Given the importance of World Bank money and the vital role Virata and the World Bank Cabinet play, observers are not altogether surprised that Marcos has already begun to backpedal. In a recent news report, he claimed that the KBL central committee since 1972 has reviewed all policies and programs adopted by the party, "but which are now claimed by the new managers." The technocrats have been unjustly targetted because "actually the political party adopted these long ago," he adds. Marcos is sending out a signal to precisely those who started the uproar, a signal that reads "back off."

Virata has ridden out the situation with the utmost calm. In the midst of the KBL squabble which launched the attack, he told his fellow party members coolly that, if interference bothered them so much, "Do not borrow."

The entire affair may have resulted in some loss of popularity for the Prime Minister, but then Virata has never had a popular base and never been a political figure. There is some speculation that Marcos will remove him from his figurehead position as Prime Minister to be replaced by Local Government Minister Jose Roño, a more traditional politician.

But Marcos needs Virata as Finance Minister if he wants to maintain his ties with the World Bank. In spite of all the flying flak, he is likely to stay on—in both positions. The more so, if the recent chorus of complaints is effective in forcing the IMF-World Bank combo to give an inch on its latest restrictions. □

'Most acutely suffering from World Bank policies as executed by Virata are Filipino workers and peasants. Their wages have objectively declined through the WB's recipe for development—Export-Led Growth.'

reached, but the economy is still running sideways rather than going up," says Washington Sycip of Sycip, Gorres and Velayo. "I'm afraid things have gotten worse in the last six months," adds Jaime Ongpin, President of Benguet Corp. and brother of Industry Minister Roberto Ongpin. "Companies can't respond to any stimulus from the economy because they are mired in debt."

Postponing government projects, always a source of patronage funds if nothing else, is hardly a popular move in this arena. Nor are the agreements to cut back short-term borrowing and to keep growth at 2%.

Loudest of all in their anti-technocrat vehemence is that select group of Filipino businessmen, the Marcos cronies. Although their monopoly of whole sectors of the Philippine economy once did much to further the World Bank's policy of export-led growth, the recent massive government bailouts of cronies in distress has drained the Philippine budget dry. The cronies are well aware that the entire World Bank cabinet, consisting of Virata, Laya, Ongpin and National Economic and Development Authority chief Placido Mapa, was inaugurated in 1981 to act as a counterweight to what is now known popularly in Philippine circles and beyond as "crony capitalism." Many of the new measures are aimed directly at this group.

Ferdinand Marcos has attempted to deflect much of the embarrassment over the degree to which he dances to the World Bank-IMF tune onto top World Bank man Virata and the rest of the World Bank Cabinet. Beyond that, ever the politician, he sees the

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
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Unions Abroad Pay Tribute



KMU: 3 Years Old and Going Strong

The KMU, an organization of labor federations, independent unions, and union affiliates numbering half a million workers, was launched at the Araneta Coliseum on Labor Day three years ago. Its growth and that of the PMP coincided with the growth of a more vocal and militant labor movement. While there were fewer strikes last year, lost man-hours, so important to companies' profits, rose phenomenally. With only 139 strikes held in 1982, 12.2 million man hours were lost, twice the 1981 figure.

INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION

The militant labor unions' calls for higher wages have also irked Marcos who has been trying to keep wages down to attract more foreign companies. At 49¢ an hour, Philippine labor is Asia's second cheapest, next only to Sri Lanka.

The KMU has kept up its call for a higher standard of living for workers—government plans and policies to the contrary. Its leadership has also constantly reminded its members that "the liberation of the Filipino worker cannot be achieved without the liberation of the nation from tyranny and foreign domination." Thus, Marcos' charges of "subversion," "sabotaging the country's economy," and the crackdown.

This genuine representative of workers' rights and interests have caught the attention of others besides the regime. The KMU and the PMP have been recognized by workers organizations internationally.

At the Araneta Coliseum rally, representatives from trade unions in Japan, India, Ireland, and Belgium were present. Messages of solidarity from North America were read.

Those lauding the KMU in its "courageous struggle against the repression of the Marcos dictatorship" included the Confederation of Canadian Unions, United Steelworkers of America, Canadian Union of Postal Workers, Canadian Union of Public Employees, the Ontario Council of United Food and Commercial Workers, and the Communication Workers of Canada.

From the United States, the following unions were among those who congratulated the KMU on its third year: the Communication Workers of America, the Plumbers Union, Service Employees International Union Local Nos. 67, 370, 400, and 616; Local 2 of the Hotel and Restaurant Workers, and the OPEIU Local 3. □

Filipino workers, totalling over 90,000, celebrated May 1st, International Workers Day, with militant rallies in major Philippine cities. They demanded higher wages and lower prices; the release of detained workers, labor leaders and other political prisoners; and the repeal of the Marcos government's anti-labor laws.

In Metro-Manila, 35,000 packed the Araneta Coliseum to hear acting chairman of the *Kilusang Mayo Uno* (May 1st Movement) Cipriano Malonzo call for a stop to American control of the Philippine economy. Former senator and outspoken Marcos critic Lorenzo Tañada spoke as the chairman of the National Coalition for the Protection of Workers' Rights.

Meanwhile, the National Federation of Sugar Workers, a member of the KMU, led 50,000 sugar workers and their supporters in a Labor Day march in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.

Rallies in Bataan and Davao drew

3,000 and 2,300 workers respectively. May 1st actions were also reported in Cagayan de Oro City and San Pablo, Lucena.

REGIME ATTEMPTS TO SQUELCH GROWING MOVEMENT

The workers' numbers, while smaller than last year's 100,000, attest to the strength and militancy of a movement that the Marcos regime attempted to decapitate only nine months earlier.

On August 13, 1982, a three-hour long raid on a number of union headquarters netted 14 top union leaders. Another sweep three weeks later added 23 more.

Felixberto Olalia, chairman of the KMU and president of the *Pagkakaisa ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino* (Solidarity of Filipino Workers) and Crispin Beltran, secretary general of the KMU and vice-president of PMP were among the 80 trade union leaders and organizers detained

after these waves of raids and arrests. Both were recently placed under house arrest following mass protests locally and internationally. Olalia, 79, and Beltran, have been ill since their incarceration.

Marcos' crackdown was seen as a response to a fast-growing labor movement, a threat to his regime. The failing Philippine economy spurred increasing labor unrest despite continued government bans on strikes and independent trade union organizing.

The regime hoped to sidetrack some of this labor energy by projecting its own Trade Unions Council of the Philippines as the officially recognized representative of Filipino workers. But TUCP protests against the low government-imposed minimum wages and other issues have been perfunctory and have reaped only insignificant concessions. The organization has become known and isolated as a yellow union.

KM Calls Nilo Tayag Traitor

In a recent special issue of its publication *Kalayaan* (Freedom), the *Kabataang Makabayan* (Nationalist Youth) attacked its former chairman, Nilo Tayag, as a turncoat. Tayag was also a KM founding member.

"It is high time to expose and refute the fascist deception behind Tayag's words and deeds," said the youth organization that has been declared illegal by the regime.

The *Kalayaan* issue was published in the midst of growing publicity around Tayag as a leading-revolutionary-turned-Marcos-disciple. Though *Kalayaan* rebuked Tayag's current political activities, it took note of his contributions in building the national democratic movement to highlight the irony in his turnaround.

For the pre-martial law generation of activists, Tayag was an inspiring leader, a symbol of youthful defiance and unwavering principle. Along with other political leaders of the 60s and the 70s like Jose Ma. Sison, he was at the core of the student activism which threw the country into a nationalist ferment.

Unmindful of his own career as a scholar and theoretician in political science, Tayag plunged full-time into mass work with students, workers and peasants, consistently denouncing imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism.

Tayag was the first test case of repression during the pre-martial law period. He



Nilo Tayag

was arrested for subversion in San Pablo, Laguna in June 1970 at a time of massive demonstrations known to activists as the First Quarter Storm. Much to Marcos' disappointment, Tayag's arrest did not slow down youth and student activism. Instead, the "Free Nilo Tayag" campaign became a rallying point around which large-scale recruitment, more mass actions

and cultural protest activities were organized.

Tayag spent seven years in prison without formal charges. During his eighth year, in November 1978, he caused much concern to his friends and supporters when he pleaded guilty to subversion before a six-man military court. They were even more distressed when he was released only two years later, though sentenced to 14 years. In 1982, Marcos granted him full amnesty.

REBEL TO FM PAWN

Their worst fears were confirmed when, to Marcos' delight, Tayag announced his support for the regime. During Marcos' state visit to the U.S. last September, he was displayed to the media as a "rebel" now working for the government and its social programs.

Today, Tayag is a mainstay in Imelda Marcos' pet project, the *Kilusang Kabuhayan sa Kaunlaran* or Movement for Progressive Livelihood which the Marcos regime boasts of as the cornerstone of the "New Republic."

Tayag also acts as chief organizer and spokesperson of *Dakilang Alyansang Organisadong Pamayanan para sa Pag-unlad* or Alliance of Organized Sectors for Progress. DAOP-PALAD works closely with the National Housing Authority, another Imelda project which has built a reputation for demolishing the homes of the urban poor.

Kalayaan condemned Tayag's insistence that he continues to uphold a "nationalist and democratic orientation." Charging

him with double talk, the KM organ expressed outrage over comments such as, "What we have supported in the past is no different from what the President is advocating," and "The Filipinos' worse enemy is themselves." *Kalayaan* reiterated its view that "The highest interests of the Filipino people are diametrically opposed to the vested interests of the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship" and that no amount of double-talk can change that fact.

Tayag was chided for pronouncing that "at no other time in our history as a people do we need to unite under one ideology—the Filipino ideology." The KM called this a rehash of Marcos' fake nationalism and a cover for the regime's pro-U.S. and anti-people crimes.

While denouncing Tayag as a traitor, *Kalayaan* called on him to renounce his ties with this regime and to remember the words from his own 1970 essay "On Commitment":

"... *Habang nandiyan sila (mga nag-papanggap na rebolusyonaryo)... hindi nila maitatatawa ang katotohanang sila'y kasangkapan at katulong ng pamahalaan sa panggigipit sa mga anak-pawis at anuman ang gawin nilang pagkukunwari at pang-iingay na sila'y para sa masa, hindi sila paniniwalaan kailanman.*"

(... While they are there [the pseudo-revolutionaries]... they can never hide the truth that they are being used as tools of the government's repression of the masses, and none of their posturings and pretensions will ever fool the masses.

The KM organ also said that even though Tayag has succumbed to the enemy, "this can never alter an established fact: the people's democratic revolution will surge forward to complete victory regardless of the Nilo Tayags, or in spite of the Nilo Tayags." □

Extradition Legislation Revived

Dangerous Bills Move Swiftly in Congress

The wheels of repressive legislation are turning again.

Two bills reintroduced in Congress early this year will revive last year's efforts to "modernize" extradition policy by linking the extradition process to foreign policy goals. The bills, S. 220 and HR 2643 together are part of the Extradition Reform Act of 1983.

S. 220 was introduced in the Senate by Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-SC). HR 2643 was introduced in the House by Rep. William Hughes (D-NC) and Rep. Harold Sawyer (R-MI).

If enacted, the bills will have dangerous implications for those in the U.S. who take active opposition to repressive regimes.

BILLS MORE REPRESSIVE

The bills, whose versions last year had a few contradictory proposals, now complement each other on the most repressive aspects of the proposed policy to shift decision-making powers on extradition questions to the Executive Branch, namely the State Department.

An aggressive lobby has been launched by the department to win over senators and congressmen on the bills' "anti-crime" stance.

Last year, the bills died in the final days of Congress as a consequence of broad opposition to their repressive character. The Committee to Oppose the U.S.-R.P. Extradition Treaty successfully brought attention to their negative impact on civil liberties, and gained support from civil libertarians, as well as labor and religious sectors.

If the two bills pass, the implications to U.S.-based opponents of repressive regimes will be serious:

- The courts do not have jurisdiction to determine "the merit of the charge by the foreign state, whether the foreign state is seeking the extradition for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person for his political opinions . . . or whether the extradition of the person to the foreign state seeking his return would be incompatible with humanitarian considerations."

The submitted evidence claiming a person's guilt may be based "in whole or in part, on hearsay or of properly certified documents" (emphasis ours).

These determinations will be made by the Secretary of State who, of course, will base his decisions on foreign policy considerations. The State Department also does not acknowledge the human rights abuses of its repressive allies, so any claim of probable political prosecution

by the extradition target stands to be rejected outright.

- A person can be arrested by U.S. authorities even when there is no evidence of the crime. The only requirements necessary to make the arrest are information identifying the person, facts about the purported offense and a description of the circumstances that justify the person's arrest.

A person can be held for 60 days even if the above information has not been submitted.

LAWS SUIT FOREIGN POLICY

The efforts to "modernize" extradition policy began with the Carter administration when Irish nationals were targeted unsuccessfully for extradition.

These efforts gained momentum as the Reagan administration began seizing every opportunity to strengthen its ties with "friendly allies."

In the past few years, U.S. foreign policy has focused on regaining its faltering

political influence internationally by defending its allies through economic and military aid. This support includes helping repressive regimes such as that of El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and the Philippines gain more credibility.

Most of these regimes have complained about the activities of U.S.-based critics and are seeking ways to neutralize them. Reagan has apparently promised help in the matter by moving for more effective extradition laws.

In support of last year's bills, then Secretary of State Alexander Haig said, "Taken together, these provisions reduce the risk of adverse foreign policy consequences which flow from either extradition improperly initiated or improperly refused."

U.S. support for the Philippine government is a case in point. Along with a \$151 million aid package to the Philippines, the U.S. government promises to crack down on U.S.-based "Filipino terrorists," asserting that "the first offense against human rights is terrorism," and more

power should be given to the U.S. government's anti-communist allies.

The two governments then signed an Extradition Treaty in 1981, listing over 42 extraditable crimes and containing "modern" provisions that streamline the extradition process between the two countries.

Reagan submitted the treaty for ratification by the Senate. However, ratification has been held up because the treaty's "modern" provisions conflicted with the existing extradition law, which would itself need to be "modernized." SB 220 and HR 2643 accomplish this and lay the groundwork for the ratification of the U.S.-R.P. treaty as well as extradition agreements with 90 other countries which would be up for renegotiations.

Meanwhile, Marcos released last year a list of U.S.-based opponents he wants extradited as soon as the treaty is ratified—revealing the political character of the agreement with the U.S.

The Reagan administration appears to have a more direct stake in silencing his allies' opponents here.

"We are in a good position to criticize U.S. support for brutal dictators," says Odette Taverna of the Coalition Against the Marcos Dictatorship/Philippine Solidarity Network Congress Task Force. "What makes us dangerous is we have all the facts to help frustrate the U.S. government's attempts to gloss over the crimes it sponsors abroad . . . we also help keep the sentiment against U.S. intervention alive."

Immigrant communities already lacking political rights, will suffer most from the legislation, Taverna asserts.

"Governments, like that of Marcos'," says Taverna, "will be given legal sanction to govern the political direction of the Filipino community in the U.S." The arm of political repression of the government's opponents, she added, will be extended to communities in the U.S.

The national committee against repressive extradition is being reactivated, with plans to draw out nationwide opposition to the bills. Civil libertarian groups have already endorsed the committee's efforts to stop this legislation.

Educational forums, housemeetings and lobbying work are being conducted to expose the bills and their implications. Maxi Villones, National CAMD/PSN Staff Director says, "We hope to bring the message to Washington, that the public is very much concerned about the dangerous trend these bills will set up in the U.S.'s wholesale support for these governments, and the subsequent disregard for our political rights in this country." □



What Other Groups Say

While the anti-Marcos movement has played a leading role in opposing extradition legislation that would help regimes like the Philippines to extend its control to the U.S. Filipino community, other movements and communities are also campaigning against it and have linked up with the anti-Marcos movement. Here is what some of them say:

FRITZ LONGCHAMP, Haitian Refugee Project:

The bill currently in the House and Senate is another facet of the war that has been waged against political organizations and individuals fighting the repressive U.S. foreign policy.

It is aimed at silencing those of us who believe in a people-to-people dialogue to overcome that policy—and unmask for the U.S. people—the true nature of the U.S. support for "friendly" regimes such as the Duvalier and Marcos dictatorships, and their counterparts.

(The Haitian Refugee Project is primarily concerned with the plight of Haitian refugees who come to the U.S. The group has also consistently challenged

such repressive policies, urging everyone concerned with civil liberties and political freedoms in the U.S. to work together and defeat these extradition bills.)

PATRICE PERILLIE, CARECEN, Central American Refugee Project:

Because of the proven discriminatory treatment of Salvadoran and other Central American refugees, this move to upgrade the extradition law comes as no surprise. It is equally consistent with the need to apply harsher extradition measures.

If passed, these bills will adversely affect Salvadoran and Central American activists in the U.S. But because of past experiences, it seems to be only a matter of time when the U.S. government will use extradition to expel them from this country.

(CARECEN is a community-based organization which provides emergency relief from deportation to Central American refugees and gives political asylum assistance. It also acts as an advocacy group on behalf of these refugees in Capitol Hill.)

KEARA O'DEMPSEY, Brehon Law Society:

The extradition law as it exists now was

designed to strike a balance between human rights and foreign policy. The proposed law is a total sell-out to perceived U.S. foreign policy needs.

A foreign government can get its hands on its nationals in the U.S. with the proposed law. We know that these governments can easily manufacture evidences against these people. For people of Irish birth or descent who would be targeted for extradition—the effect of this law is very simple. Every single of one them will be extradited. In particular, the provisions on bail and detention are a significant change. These provisions will place Irish nationals in the same situation as with those charged with criminal murder here.

Traditionally, as soon as one is requested for extradition, that person is considered as a piece of property, someone valuable requested by a foreign government. The U.S. as a foreign power, under the new law, can assure these government that it can "deliver the goods."

(Brehon Law Society is a legal organization which provides advocacy assistance to people of Irish birth or descent charged with subversion or complicity with the Irish Republican Army.) □

Linked to 1981 Slayings

Seminar Exposes U.S. Foreign Policy Connection

Special to the AK

SEATTLE—A seminar attended by more than 175 people exposed the U.S. government's legal and political maneuvers aimed at thwarting the justice efforts in the *Domingo v. Marcos* civil suit filed last September.

Entitled "U.S. National Security Policies and Civil Liberties," the seminar—sponsored by the Committee for Justice for Domingo and Viernes last April 30—focused on the use of the doctrine of national security which "stems directly from U.S. foreign policy needs."

"The seminar examined the dangerous implications of this type of move," stated Rene Cruz, national spokesperson of the Union of Democratic Filipinos (KDP), and program moderator. "In no uncertain terms, if the U.S. gets immunity, they will be declaring open season on people who seriously disagree with U.S. foreign policy interests."

IMMUNITY PLEA BOOSTS CONSPIRACY THEORY

Cruz was referring to the immunity plea entered by the U.S. government last January as a defendant in the civil suit. Charged with direct complicity in the double murder of KDP activists Silme Domingo and Gene Viernes in June 1981, the U.S. government claimed "absolute immunity due to national security and foreign policy considerations."

The civil suit was filed in September, 1982 on behalf of the estates and families of the murdered victims. Charging high level Philippine and U.S. government involvement in the murder conspiracy, the suit seeks a \$30 million settlement, and injunctive relief from the continued harass-

ment, surveillance and violence against anti-Marcos Filipinos in the U.S. by Philippine and U.S. government intelligence agents.

Recounting the covert and overt acts used to cover up the murder conspiracy, CJDV national coordinator Cindy Domingo, remarked: "There exist profound biases that weigh against the common person's demand for justice, should that demand conflict with the political interests of the state and the ruling powers . . ."

The seminar also featured Richard Falk, Princeton University professor of International Law, who charged that U.S. foreign policy inherently violates international human rights, and "even leads to murders of political opponents like Domingo and Viernes."

"This case is not only shocking," Falk stressed, "it is in its way, routine—routine in the sense that where state interests are at stake, dictators dispose of anything that stands in their way."

Larry Serjeant of the National Conference of Black Lawyers, provided a brief historical account of the use of the national security doctrine and its connection with the systematic repression of civil rights and progressive movements in this country.

ARCHDIOCESE BACKS CIVIL SUIT

In the wake of charges bolstering high-level conspiracy in the cannery union officials' murders, Catholic Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen issued a statement at the seminar, calling for full prosecution of all those implicated in the killings, and strongly suggested rejection of the U.S. government's immunity plea.

In addition, the Archbishop's statement, read by Tony Lee of the Justice and Peace

Center of the Archdiocese, criticized U.S. conciliation of human rights violations in the Philippines.

"The U.S. government's obsession with 'national security' inevitably results in policies which excuse human rights violations and ignore economic and social injustices because all these other concerns are subordinated to maintaining or furthering the 'security' interests of the U.S."

The Archdiocese joined the American Friends Services Committee, the American Civil Liberties Union, World Peace Through Law, the National Committee Against Repressive Legislation, the Coalition Against the Marcos Dictatorship/Philippine Solidarity Network, and the KDP, as signatories to the friend of the court brief (*amicus curiae*) submitted in the Domingo/Viernes case.

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY UNDER FIRE


Meanwhile, public anger is brewing in the Seattle civil rights community as Pro-

complice, Esteban Ablang, fled to the Philippines shortly after the slaying incident last January.

Despite "overwhelming" evidences linking Baruso to the murder incidents, Maleng considered these facts as "irrelevant material," and upheld the revenge motive in the Domingues murder case—a theory rejected immediately after the incident.

"The government has been giving us flak every step of the way in this case," stated CJDV's Cindy Domingo, strongly hinting of a high-level cover-up. She cited the use of a professional witness, La Vane Forsythe, in the attempt to mislead the jury during the murder trials, and win acquittal for Jimmy Ramil and Ben Guloy who were later found guilty in the Domingo-Viernes slayings. It was later revealed that Forsythe had ties with the late Howard Hughes' former aide, as well as to the CIA and intelligence world.

Following the conviction of Ramil and Guloy, FBI Seattle office head George



'The U.S. government's obsession with "national security" inevitably results in policies which excuse human rights violations and ignore economic and social injustices...'

—Arch. Raymond Hunthausen

secuting Attorney Norm Maleng, despite strong evidence implicating Constatine "Tony" Baruso in the murders, refused to indict the former Union Local 37 president.

A sworn affidavit filed in March by a "close friend" of Teodoro "Boy Pilay" Domingues, latest victim in the Seattle murders, verified that Baruso put up a \$5,000 contract to have Domingo and Viernes killed.

The testimony also revealed that Baruso wanted Boy Pilay dead because he "knew too much," and "had to be shut up, silenced."

Valentino Barber recently was found guilty of murdering Domingues; his ac-

Fisher recommended to the victims' families that Baruso be given total immunity from charges in exchange for his testimony against other lower-level figures in the conspiracy.

Again, in January this year, the Justice Department filed a "Protective Order" in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent Baruso from being examined under oath by attorneys for the plaintiffs.

"We believe Maleng is under pressure not to indict Baruso under any circumstance," Domingo stated. "As with other 'neutral' judicial institutions in the U.S., the prosecuting attorney clearly operates with the same political motivations and dangerous intentions as those above him." □

Memorial Statement by the National Executive Board of the KDP

Cynthia Maglaya, KDP Co-Founder, Revolutionary



Cynthia Maglaya, a co-founder of the Union of Democratic Filipinos (KDP) and a member of its national leadership, died after suffering a cardiac arrest May 23 in Seattle. She had been in poor health for many years. Cynthia was one of the key KDP leaders who shaped its political and ideological direction. Up to the time of her death, Cynthia remained an influential force in the support movement for the Philippine struggle active in the U.S. and Canada. Her friends and comrades look at her passing as a deep

personal and political loss.

Cynthia's political beginnings date back to the late 60s and early 70s in the Philippines, a period which radicalized thousands of young men and women in the country. A member of the *Kabataang Makabayan*, the militant student/youth organization in the forefront of the nationalist upsurge prior to the declaration of martial law, Cynthia was a product of the historic period known as the First Quarter Storm which produced many of the finest leaders of the national democratic movement.

In 1970 she came to the U.S. where she continued her political involvement by building support for the Philippine struggle. When she arrived, she found ferment in the Filipino community, particularly on the West Coast. Young Filipinos, most of whom were born and raised here had become inspired by the civil rights movement and the movement against the Vietnam War, and were raising their voices against the age-old treatment of Filipinos as second class citizens in this country.

Ferdinand Marcos' declaration of martial law merged this movement with the cause of new immigrants like Cynthia. Young Filipino-Americans and recent immigrants alike began taking another look at the history of their homeland and at the struggles of the first Filipino immigrants for equality. A movement took shape against the Marcos dictatorship, against U.S. government support for this tyranny, and against the discrimination faced by Filipinos in the U.S.

Cynthia's decision to work for the revolutionary cause of Philippine independence and the fight for racial equality was not without historical precedent in the U.S. Filipino community. The first generation of Filipinos in this country took up the bitter fight against intense racism and for better working conditions in the farms and canneries of Hawaii and the West Coast. These Filipino activists of the 20s and 30s, like the

writer Carlos Bulosan and union organizer Chris Mensalvas, also realized the source of their homeland's poverty which forced Filipinos to leave for the U.S. to seek a better life. They took up the cause of Philippine independence from American colonialism even while battling with scabs or exchanging blows with rabid racists.

Cynthia had a direct hand in building support for the Philippine revolution beyond the Filipino community. Leading the work of the International Association of Filipino Patriots, she helped establish important ties for the national democratic movement with other solidarity and progressive movements in the United States and Canada. She is widely known for her commitment to revolutionary internationalism.

Cynthia was more than a political activist. Within the KDP she was known for her generous concern for her colleagues. This quality made Cynthia a very effective leader, one who provided stability and inspired confidence among activists. Despite her physical limitations due to poor health, Cynthia was a boundless source of strength, always struggling to provide leadership in her particular responsibilities.

When Cynthia died, she was preparing the ground for the launching of the Institute for Filipino Resources and Information—a center that will, in the near future, be a source of educational materials about the history and experience of Filipinos in this country and the history and struggles of Filipinos in the homeland.

Cynthia Maglaya gave everything she had to the cause of Philippine liberation and to the fight for justice and equality in this country. In the Philippines, a lot of people like her die in battle. Cynthia was not felled by bullets like many of her counterparts in the Philippines or like her comrades in Seattle—Gene Viernes and Silme Domingo. Neither did she die in the hands of Marcos' torturers. She died fighting nonetheless. □

House Vote Nears

Senate Endorses Repressive Immigration Bill

Despite growing opposition among immigrant communities and civil liberties advocates, the "Simpson/Mazzoli Bill" passed the Senate May 18. The controversial anti-immigrant, anti-labor immigration reform bill is expected to become law this year.

"There is a need for immigration reform that would grant rights for all immigrants in this country, but this bill will only further restrict democratic rights," said Bill Tamayo, a spokesperson for the Bay Area Committee Against the Simpson/Mazzoli Bill.

Formally known as the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983, the bill was modelled after last year's Simpson/Mazzoli Bill, which died during the lame duck Congress. The Senate vote of 76 to 18 indicated its strong backing of the bill. Laurie Mayeno, chairperson of the Southern California Committee Against Simpson/Mazzoli, remarked, "The Senate clearly defeated liberal amendments and generally moved with making the bill more restrictive than before."

POLITICAL ASYLUM

Several key provisions on political asylum, employer sanctions and the legalization or

"amnesty" program, sparked much controversy during the passage of the Senate bill.

Many of the legal and procedural requirements for political asylum applications would be tightened under the proposed bill, requiring that applications be filed within 14 days of deportation or exclusion proceedings by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Refugee and civil liberties forces had pressured Congress not to deny the "judicial review" process for asylum applicants. The bill would have severely restricted a refugee's access to a court appeal against immediate deportation. An amendment was passed which would give limited access to such a process, but the provisions remain very restrictive.

Hardest hit by the new ruling will be immigrants fleeing U.S.-backed repressive regimes in countries like El Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti. While refugees from socialist countries like Cuba, Poland, or Vietnam have been liberally admitted to this country, less than one-tenth of 1% of asylum petitions from refugees from El Salvador and Haiti have been granted.

EMPLOYER SANCTIONS

The bill intends to impose civil and



"GIVE ME YOUR RICH, YOUR FAMOUS, YOUR NOBEL LAUREATES, YOUR RUSSIAN POETS AND POLISH EMBASSIES, YOUR RESPECTABLE WHITE ANTI-SOVIETS YEARNING TO BREATHE FREE....."



criminal penalties for employers who "knowingly" hire undocumented workers.

While promoters claim that sanctions will stop employers from "enticing" undocumented workers with jobs, and reduce the "pull" of immigrant labor into this country, many states like California which already have similar sanctions, fail to enforce the provisions.

Under pressure from the major agricultural interests, an amendment was passed that would essentially delay any penalties against growers for another three years.

Opposition groups charge that these sanctions will instead concentrate on the undocumented during investigations, resulting in fines, jail and deportation for the workers. Also, employers could use the sanctions threat to not hire "foreign-looking" —minority—workers. An amendment that

would have provided mechanisms to challenge discrimination against minorities because of employer sanctions, was defeated 59-29 by the Senate.

In addition, the sanctions program would require a repressive "national identification system" to prove legal status.

LEGALIZATION

The Senate version provides for a two-tier legalization system, allowing permanent resident status to undocumented workers who have been in the U.S. continuously since before January 1, 1977. The second tier allows temporary resident status for those who arrived in the U.S. sometime between January 1, 1977 and January 1, 1980, and have been in the U.S. continuously since then.

New permanent residents would not be allowed any federal health, welfare or other benefits for the first three years of their permanent status.

"By the bill's restrictive provisions, only about 10% of the applicants (for legal resident status) will qualify," stated Antonio Rodriguez of the Coalition for Visas and Rights for the Undocumented in a Los Angeles news conference. "The other 90% will be deportable," Rodriguez added.

INS Commissioner Alan Nelson estimated that there are some six million undocumented workers currently living in the U.S.

The Senate version also approved provisions that will set a strict ceiling of a total of 425,000 persons allowed to immigrate to the U.S. each year, not including political refugees. Currently, 270,000 visas are available each year worldwide, but allows limited visas beyond that for parents, spouses and children of U.S. citizens.

Fifth preference would be restricted to unmarried brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens, while the second preference would be limited to spouses and minor children of permanent residents.

The House version of the bill (HR 1510), is expected to be voted upon by the end of summer, pending review and debate by a number of House committees. Although the House bill contains more liberalized provisions, as compared to the Senate bill, opposition groups have warned that protest against the bill should not be lessened.

For example, although the House bill proposes legalization for those undocumented living in the U.S. since January 1, 1982, no federal benefits would be allowed for five years. Even if this provision passes the House, it may not survive the Senate's version. Most observers have agreed that in ironing out differences between the two versions of the bill after the expected House passage, the more restrictive Senate bill would be offered for final approval in both houses of Congress.

Opposition groups around the country and in Washington, D.C. are continuing to pressure the House to vote against the bill. Demonstrations have also been planned in many cities with large immigrant populations to emphasize the strong opposition to the legislation.

According to BACASM's Bill Tamayo, the effect of the bill is already being felt, even before its passage. "Work place raids and deportations by the INS have increased all over the country. If Simpson/Mazzoli passes, immigrants, especially the undocumented, will be increasingly targeted for 'legalized' repression." □

Big Affirmative Action Issue in Hawaii

Pinoys Want Equal Access to State Jobs

By DEAN ALEGADO

"Filipinos compose 12.6% of the state's labor force, but only 5% of the state government workforce and are consistently underrepresented in all but a few department and job categories," says the June 1980 report of the state's Office of Affirmative Action.

Rep. Eloise Yamashita-Tungpalan cited these statistics when she introduced to the Hawaii Legislature last April House Resolution 297 "Requesting a Study of the Representation of Filipinos in State Government Employment." The resolution wants the Legislative Auditor to "report its findings and recommendations" to the 1984 Legislature.

The figures cited by HR 297, according to KDP-member Raymond Camacho, only "confirm the suspicions that most people in the community have felt all along; that, despite the creation of an Office of Affirmative Action, the state has done very little to alleviate the problem of ethnic imbalance in its hiring practices."

HAWAII'S BAD RECORD

The Hawaii state government's hiring practices and employment patterns have been the target of criticism in recent years. Since the state government is one of the largest sources of employment in the state with 45,150 employees in 1980, its deficiencies glaringly stand out.

The government workforce reveals serious ethnic imbalances, with Filipinos, Hawaiians, and women underrepresented in the total state workforce and/or in upper level occupations within state agencies.

The number and nature of discrimination cases filed with the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against the state of Hawaii between 1973 and 1980 is revealing. There was a total of 148 cases, of which the largest number, 43 (25% of the total) was filed on the basis of sex discrimination.

The next largest category, 31 cases (18%), was based on race discrimination against Filipinos. In almost half of the cases (46%), discrimination was alleged

in hiring practices, followed by promotion (10%) and harassment (10%).

Leading the agencies with the largest number of cases filed against them were the Department of Education, Department of Health, and the Department of Personnel Services.

The State OAA plan of June 1980, admits that "destructive and persistent discrimination remains in our employment systems. Its presence is evident when our policies continue to have significantly unequal effects on certain groups in our society, even when the employer has no conscious intent to discriminate."

With Filipinos being the most underrepresented group in the state workforce, the OAA plan set a hiring goal of 2,026 additional new employees of Filipino ancestry. Filipinos are underrepresented in categories of official-administrator, protective service, office-clerical, skilled craft, and professional, and are mostly found in the service-maintenance category.

LACK OF COMMITMENT

However, critics contend that despite the creation of the Office of Affirmative Action in 1977 and numerous laws and policies, lack of equal employment persists because there is no commitment from the highest levels of state government.

The OAA has no enforcement powers. It merely develops plans in coordination with state agencies, on whose good will the success of these plans depends. Others

charge that thorough record-keeping by state agencies on grievances and complaints of discrimination is "non-existent."

Although most state agencies have an EEO officer, the position is largely ineffective, say Dr. Amy Agbayani of Operation Manong. There is no coordinated training for EEO officers. For some of the smaller agencies, the department personnel officer is also the EEO officer because there are no budget provisions for a separate position.


"It is a bit like having Dracula in charge of the blood bank or the fox in charge of the chicken coop," says Agbayani.

Civil service barriers and the collective bargaining procedures of the Hawaii Government Employees Action, HGEA also hinder equal employment opportunities.

Recruitment for positions is often conducted within agencies or eligibility lists are drawn from the existing state employee pool.

Clearly, equal employment opportunity is an issue rising within the Filipino and other minority communities in Hawaii. Now that the issue of equal employment opportunity is again out in the open, the state might have a difficult time sweeping it back under the rug in the halls of the Legislature.

The more perceptive in the Filipino community are demanding more than studies and recommendations from the state. They want real action and they want it now. □



Filipino custodian on duty; Filipinos in Hawaii occupy the lowest paid, least stable jobs.

By JON MELEGRITO

An Unreachable Star:

Embassy Courts D.C. Community—Avidly

It is no secret to the Filipino community here in Washington, D.C. that the Philippine Embassy is bending over backwards to win its support. No less than Ambassador Kokoy Romualdez, Imelda's brother, has publicly stated its mission: to unite this community and inspire "national loyalty to country."

In their strongest bid to woo the community since the Marcos state visit last September, the embassy recently staged a "supershow of stars," a massive stage show featuring 100 movie, TV, stage, and recording stars direct from the Philippines.

"The cast is a virtual who's who in the Philippine entertainment world," said the publicity flyer which screamed the names of Vilma, Dolphy and Nora in big bold letters.

However, the 3,000 Filipinos who flocked to the prestigious Washington Convention Center right in the heart of downtown D.C., could not but help see through the lavish propaganda gimmick.

Maryanne Pineda of Annandale, Virginia, boycotted the event, deploring the "shallow kind of entertainment" being used to court the community.

"I know a lot of people who consider this a waste of time. I won't go out of my way, and many of my friends won't either. The idea of going out to see movie stars is so corny. It's an insult, actually, if they think they can gather us all together and make us all applaud."

Carmen Saso of Alexandria, Virginia similarly expressed her outrage: "It's unfortunate that it does not take much more than free food and drinks and movie entertainers for some of us to barter away our principles."

Many of those who attended the extravaganza, put together by the Philippine Ministry of Tourism, were bussed in from nearby Virginia and Maryland.

After the D.C. performance, a corps of stage and movie personalities flew to San Francisco, Seattle, and Los Angeles to continue the entertainment blitz before audiences organized by local Philippine consular offices.

The new campaign to forge a pro-Marcos base in the U.S. Filipino community is on with a big start. Much of it however, started much earlier in the Washington, D.C. area.

CHANGE OF HEART

Prior to the Marcos visit, the Philippine Embassy publicly disavowed any interest in local community affairs. Not surprisingly, the disinterest changed as soon as it became certain that Marcos was coming to D.C. for the long-awaited state visit.

The immediate problem, however, was how to create a semblance of community support, enough to convince the White House that Marcos was at least "popular" among his countrymen and women here in the U.S.

Not having a base in the community, except for a handful of pro-Marcos diehards, the embassy had to operate quickly with its biggest asset: money.

What followed was a series of embassy-sponsored social events: open house receptions, picnics, leadership seminars, cocktail parties—replete with free food and entertainment. Special attention was given to sectors like the World Bank-Filipino women whose network was used for publicizing other similar events. Conveniently, they were also mobilized to serve as hostesses and receptionists.

Despite the highly-financed organizing drive to bring out tens of thousands of well-wishers upon Marcos' arrival, only less than 2,000 showed up, most of whom were bussed in from Norfolk and Richmond, two military towns in Virginia. They were, of course, promised free food and lodging at the Sheraton Park Hotel for a whole week while Marcos was in town.

COURTSHIP INTENSIFIES

The Filipino community, weary from all the lavish attention it received, had a welcomed respite after the whirlwind Marcos visit. But not for long.

One evening in January, embassy officials led by Tony Romualdez and Roots Anson-Roa presided over a meeting of a



Philippine Ambassador Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez promotes social events as an important part of consulate relations with the U.S.-Filipino community.



A near-capacity crowd filled the San Francisco Cow Palace for "Kumustahan '83," a free eight-hour star-studded entertainment extravaganza sponsored by the Philippine Consulate last June 4.

Thousands took advantage of the free food, beer, and T-shirts while being entertained by 70 top R.P. stars including Nora Aunor and Dolphy.

Banners reading "Isang Bansa, Isang Diwa," "Sikat ang Filipino," and "Ang Filipino'y Filipino Saan Man" ringed the arena as announcers frequently reminded the audience that the event was brought to them through the "generosity and grace of Mr. and Mrs. Ferdinand Marcos."

dozen community leaders purportedly to continue efforts initiated during the state visit in promoting the "social, educational and cultural interests of the community."

That same evening, an ad hoc committee was appointed to begin preparations for Philippine Independence Day in June. While a barrio *fiesta* celebration attracted only 500 Filipinos last year, organizers projected an attendance of 10,000 this year. In one of the planning meetings, Consul Tony Villamor assured the committee of the embassy's assistance and cooperation.

THE 'UNREACHABLE STAR'?

In the meantime, the embassy's PR work continued. One weekend in March, Ambassador Romualdez personally led a contingent of big-name entertainers who performed at mass-and-dinner programs that reportedly reached 6,000 Filipinos in separate gatherings in Washington, Maryland and Virginia.

With the rallying cry "Catholics to the core, Filipinos all!" the mass and music gimmick was certainly in line with the embassy's unity propaganda—with love

of God and love of country as interchangeable themes.

During one of these events, popular singer Joe Valdez dedicated a favorite song to the ambassador: "The Impossible Dream." Capturing this rare emotional moment rather aptly, *Filipino Chronicle* columnist Andrea Olympia Sigler wrote: "I thought they did a magnificent job of imparting the message of unity—brought it out more eloquently than any orator ever could."

"... I caught the eyes of the Ambassador seated a few chairs away. As we were leaving, he turned to me: 'The Filipino community—an unreachable star,' he said sadly. My heart went out to him. He tries so hard. Why does it seem so difficult to reach out and touch the Philippine community in America?"

'A GAME, A CHARADE'

Some observers, however, are not given to such melodrama. A prominent Filipino businessman who preferred not to be identified, suggested that the ambassador's frustrations are due to ignorance.

"They [the embassy] do not know how to handle the community," he said. "Their procedure and behavior are in disparity with each other. They say they want to inspire loyalty to country, but if they know you are not on their side, their attitude towards you changes."

He recounted how he used to be invited to dinners and informed of events at the embassy.

"But as soon as they learn that your political leaning is 'kontra sa kanila,' then suddenly you don't get calls from them anymore. Honestly, I feel a little insulted that they invite me to dine and expect to get my vote. Sure, I will go and eat and watch the big-time shows, but that does not reach my heart. It's all a game, a charade," he said.

THE CIPAA CONNECTION

Parts of the embassy's organizing blitz, however, have actually paid off. The most visibly avid supporter of the Marcos regime in D.C. today is the Combined International Philippine-American Association, composed largely of retired military personnel residing in Oxon Hill, Maryland.

CIPAA took the lead in forming a welcome committee for the Marcos visit, although it claims to be "non-political." It led the onslaught against opposition groups and individuals, condemning them in public statements as "unpatriotic, disloyal, terrorist, communist, etc." In embassy-instigated events, CIPAA acts as the most reliable and loyal executor of the embassy's propaganda plan.

Ruben and Rose Curameng, CIPAA's conjugal leaders, are among the embassy's most trusted allies. It was Rose who sparked off controversy when she called for a community tribute to Marcos. At first, she was poo-hooed by some people in the small pro-Marcos camp. But, as soon as the embassy put its muscle where her mouth was, the jealous wranglings ended.

Needless to say, the Curamengs were rewarded well for their hard work. Rose had her moment of grandeur when she alone, as the sole representative of the D.C. Filipino community, presented an award to Marcos during his visit.

For hugging the limelight, the Curamengs did not win very many friends even among the pro-Marcos diehards. But that did not stop Rose from castigating the leadership of the Philippine Heritage Federation for refusing to endorse the Marcos welcome. Subsequently, she pulled CIPAA out of the Federation when the PHF passed a resolution deploring the embassy's attempt to form another umbrella organization called the Congress for Overseas Filipino Communities.

AND WHAT OF THE OPPOSITION?

The embassy's community organizing drive has bumped into a few other rough spots.

When David Valderama, as then president of the PHF, attended the first organizing meeting of the June 12 celebration, CIPAA-led forces verbally pounced on him for his critical comments during the Marcos visit.

While he remains unrepentant, he is now cautious about making any further comments. He wants to give them the benefit of the doubt, he said, as long as their efforts are strictly non-political.

Angkan, a Fil-Am youth group is less naive. When *Angkan* confronted the embassy asking if its unity call included opposition groups, the response was not surprising.

Groups like CAMD, MFP and other individuals, according to consulate officials, cannot possibly make a contribution to national unity, let alone national loyalty.

Angkan has since withdrawn from the June 12th Organizing Committee after initially expressing interest. Lamented one member who wishes to remain anonymous, "At first I honestly believed they meant it when they said they are for uniting all Filipinos regardless of political differences. But if they are going to define what patriotism is and make that a basis for participation and unity, I will have none of it."

Ambassador Kokoy may never understand why it is so difficult to reach the hearts and minds of the Filipino community and why no amount of reaching out will ever make his dreams come true. □

Reagan and El Salvador

CAUGHT IN A QUAGMIRE



By WICKS GEAGA

The situation in El Salvador "ultimately may require a willingness to use troops," warned Lt. Gen. Wallace Nutting, commander of the U.S. forces in Latin America and the military analyst behind Reagan's foreign policy in the region.

Nutting's statement was a chilling admission that, as Washington's crisis in El Salvador nears the breaking point, the danger of direct U.S. involvement heightens.

U.S. intervention cost the Vietnamese a half-million lives and untold destruction—a price that may yet be exacted from the Salvadoran revolution and the peoples of Central America.

The toll on American lives in Vietnam was 58,000—a price that the U.S. public does not want to pay again. But regardless of the cost, at stake is the "national security of all the Americas," Reagan recently declared.

At the heart of the U.S. dilemma is the rapidly deteriorating position of its client government in El Salvador. Widely exposed as the most murderous regime in the hemisphere, the Salvadoran government has lost all popular support internally and is politically isolated internationally. It has earned the unanimous condemnation of Amnesty International, the International Committee of Jurists and the Human Rights Council of the Organization of American States.

Militarily, the government forces have lost the initiative, and face the real possibility of defeat by the guerilla forces. U.S. officials are the first to admit that the Salvadoran army—described by some observers as a nine-to-five army with weekends off—suffers from a conspicuous lack of fighting spirit and military strength.

GUERRILLAS GAIN MORE LEVERAGE

The FMLN-FDR has ably demonstrated its military capacity and high political motivation while pitted against a government force five times its size. Still in the midst of a current offensive, the FMLN-FDR has already seized dozens of towns and launched attacks in almost every part of the country. Particularly impressive was its capture of Berlin, a city which took 1,600 government troops in addition to massive bombing and rocketing by U.S.-supplied dragonfly jets to retake. The rebels presently hold 25% of the country under their control.

Despite the tragic deaths of two of their top leaders, Ana Maria Montes and Cayetano Carpio, the revolutionary forces continue to advance on all battlefronts. Dispelling speculation in Washington that they were in a state of disarray, the rebel forces seized Santa Rosa de Lima, the key town in northern La Union province, thus placing almost the entire northeast corner of El Salvador under FMLN-FDR control. A week later, guerillas seized the heavily-fortified town of Cinquera in Cabanas province and overran four small military posts in the surrounding hills.

Just as impressive is the FMLN's broad base of political support. Practically the whole labor movement of about a half-million public and private workers, organized into a coalition under the Committee of Labor Unity, recognize the political and military leadership of the FMLN-FDR. Even the centrist Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, also targets of rightist death squads, have gravitated toward the FMLN's program for revolutionary change.

Internationally, the FMLN enjoys the support of many Latin American and European governments, all of whom are pressing the junta to negotiate with the rebels.

REAGAN MANEUVERS

To reverse the situation in El Salvador, the U.S. is employing the vast diplomatic arsenal at its disposal. Going against widespread international opinion, Reagan has repeatedly dismissed the FMLN as an isolated band of renegades with little influence. Reagan has found such a portrayal an essential justification for his administration's hardline stance of no negotiations with the rebels.

Taught by the experience of the Paris Peace Talks with the Vietnamese liberation forces, Reagan realizes that negotiations would only guarantee the FMLN-FDR an early peace and a substantial share of the power—a concession that runs counter to U.S. "national security interests" in the region.

Also, since the U.S. would not tolerate any FMLN-FDR gains and would have to violate any peace agreements anyway, Reagan does not want to set the stage for the U.S.' further political isolation down the road.

To legitimize its uncompromising stance against negotiations, Reagan is wringing the most out of Nicaragua's refusal to negotiate

with the CIA-financed *contras* invading its territory.

The dismissal of Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders for contemplating possible dialogues with the guerillas and the replacement of U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton who once in a while would criticize the Salvadoran regime's "excesses," signal the full hardening of the Reagan position.

Increasingly pressured by calls from Mexico, Venezuela, Columbia, Panama, and even the U.S. National Council of Bishops for immediate talks, the U.S. is instead arranging a replay of last year's elections which bought the regime some badly needed time, and a certification from Congress of its "gains in human rights." The upcoming December elections are expected to be just as corrupt and the resulting political mileage just as short-lived.

Pressing its diplomatic offensive, the Administration recently released another White Paper, again warning of "the Soviet-Cuba threat" spreading throughout Central America. The administration's hardly convincing evidence: more photos of "Cuban-style training areas near Managua and Soviet ships unloading military supplies on Nicaragua's Pacific coast." To offset the universal isolation of the Salvadoran regime, the U.S. is circulating reports of "rebel massacres" of captured government troops.

Simultaneously, the Reagan administration is step-by-step escalating its military role in the war in such a way as not to precipitate an upheaval of mass protest inside the U.S.

UPPING U.S. MILITARY ROLE

The latest reports originating from Salvadoran government sources reveal that U.S. officers have moved into the top levels of the Salvadoran military and "are

now running the war." These actions are in direct violation of Congressional guidelines that permit American advisers to train Salvadoran military personnel, but prohibit their direct involvement in the war.

And to circumvent the Congress-imposed limitation of 55 advisers in El Salvador, the Pentagon announced that it will send an additional 100 advisers to a reactivated WWII naval base in Honduras, where 2,400 Salvadoran soldiers will be trained.

Meanwhile, the Salvadoran army has launched counterinsurgency and rural pacification programs patterned after the CORDS and Phoenix programs which in Vietnam claimed over 30,000 lives. "Search and destroy" missions are to clear the FMLN from their zones of popular control. Then, the army plans to regroup the remaining inhabitants in "strategic hamlets"—away from their regular means of livelihood and away from the guerillas they support.

Desperate as the U.S. measures appear, there is little confidence that the Salvadoran army can reverse its rapidly deteriorating position. Some U.S. military analysts predict that, by the fall—the season when the rebels have launched their last three annual offensives—the war will reach crisis proportions. The U.S. will then be faced with the ultimate choice of losing the war, or unleashing its full military force against the guerillas.

IMMINENT SHOWDOWN?

Given its stakes in the conflict, the Reagan administration is undoubtedly mapping out plans for the imminent showdown. The intensifying incursions into Nicaragua, the stepped up intelligence gathering by U.S. spy planes, the increasingly hysterical alarms from Washington of the "communist threat" in Central America, and the mounting hostility of Costa Rica and Honduras toward Nicaragua all strongly suggest that a carefully provoked incident—Gulf of Tonkin style—might be the pretext for a U.S. invasion of Central America.

In response to the unmistakable signs of increased U.S. war preparations, the guerillas claimed their first U.S. military casualty by killing a U.S. adviser. It was a signal to the U.S. that its troops will meet annihilation, and a reminder to the American public of the grave danger that besets both countries.

The American people—while refusing to give Reagan the mandate for unbridled use of U.S. military force—have yet to forcefully demonstrate their solidarity with the Salvadoran people.

While popular sentiment against U.S. intervention is strong, this opposition rests mainly on the fear of losing American lives, rather than on a refusal to support the entire U.S. agenda in Central America. This is a weakness that Reagan is only too eager to exploit. Unless the U.S. anti-war movement heightens its vigilance, sharpens its political perspective, and prepares for massive confrontations with Reagan's drive for intervention, there may yet be a second Vietnam—in Central America. □

'... regardless of the cost, at stake is the "national security of all the Americas," Reagan recently declared.'



Mass funerals for the mass murders committed by the military government in El Salvador.