

M A G U I N D A N A O

A TRIBUTE TO THE
MUSLIM - FILIPINOS

presented by


PILIPINO AMERICAN ALLIANCE

and

KATIPUNAN (UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FILIPINOS)

SUNDAY MAY 19 7:30 pm

ZELLERBACH AUDITORIUM, U.C. BERKELEY



SYNOPSIS

Before the play starts, Abraham, who plays a mute in the play, steps forward to talk to the audience. He represents the masses of poor Muslims and relates some of the historical hardships that the Muslim people have experienced.

As the play begins, the family of Datu Amil, an incumbent mayor, is busy preparing for the future wedding of their daughter Fatimah, to Alrashin. Alrashin is the right hand of Datu Amil, a young Muslim lawyer who graduated recently from the big schools in Manila. Fatimah is so annoyed this day by all the fuss and preparations of the traditional wedding. But her mood turns quickly to joy as she is unexpectedly reunited with her beloved brother Ismail. Ismail is a revolutionary guerilla fighter who has secretly returned to his hometown in order to find out more about the problems that face the people of Barrio Linantangan. The scene is touching as brother and sister discuss the reasons why they have been separated - their different political views.

Alrashin enters, he is a boyhood friend of Ismail. Together they all agree that they want justice for the Muslim people. Where they cannot agree however is what's the best path to justice - reform or revolution?

Scene two opens on one of the enemies of the Muslim people - represented by the Balilis brothers. Oman Balilis, ex-mayor, is plotting out how to "win" the upcoming elections through a combination of graft, corruption and terror. Enters his older brother the Congressman. Both brothers have sold out the ancestral rights of the Muslim people to enhance their own wealth and selfish ends. These bureaucrat capitalists have all kinds of connections and contracts with the Manila politicians and foreign imperialists. In fact, they have already sold the lands of the people in Barrio Linantangan over to an American Company. They stole these lands through purchasing fakedeeds in Manila. Now they plan to send a bulldozer to knock down the peoples' homes and drive them out. Hajija, mistress of Balilis, comes from poor origins and has experienced much hardship. She wants to warn the people of Barrio Linantangan but she is not sure what to do. Should she side with the people or remain loyal to her masters?

At the house of Datu Amil, guests and relatives are enjoying the extravagant wedding celebration. There is much dancing, merriment and discussion. But the guests, particularly want to talk about the upcoming elections. They all feel Datu Amil will win again because of his honesty and popularity. Regardless of any underhanded tricks on the part of the Balilis brothers, those at the wedding feel that everything will be fine. But here come the people of Barrio Linantangan; seeking Datu Amil. Their homes are

being bulldozed, and barbed wires are being put around their lands. Abrah-m, the mute, leads the barrio people in protest.

Scene 4 opens with Datu Amil and the angry townspeople marching to the place of Balilis to confront him about the bulldozing. This scene shows the kind of hatred the townspeople have against corrupt politicians even if they call themselves Muslims. An argument ensues between the good Datu Amil and Oman Balilis. The townspeople know it is senseless to expect mercy or reason from



Balilis - Datu Amil and Alrashin will defend the peoples' rights in court. They all leave determined to get back their lands... Oman is afraid, he is determined to try to stop the people and Datu Amil.

But at the wedding, Datu Amil prepares to spend the night at the office working with Alrashin. They must prepare for the court battle tomorrow. The mother Parimata feels upset and confused about these problems. The discussion between she and Fatimah turns to the subject of Ismail. Fatimah remembers Ismail and begins to wonder whether in fact, he may be right. Will it take revolutionary struggle to really put an end to these injustices faced by the people of Maguindanao? Hajija enters; She has come to warn them that the Balilis brothers plan to kill Datu Amil. Hajija and Fatimah run off to save Datu Amil - gun shots are heard...

Scene 6 opens at the house of the enemies. The Balilis brothers have murdered the good Datu Amil, but they cannot kill the just cause he fought for. In fact, their crime is exposed - Fatimah and Hajija witnessed the killing and will testify against the Balilis brothers. The peoples' anger grows - Balilis must move quickly to save himself.

His goons will create the outward appearance of a 'religious war' - a few Muslims and christians will be intentionally killed,



the mosque will be burned... all this treachery to cover his own crimes and those of the Imperialists. The Congressman calls his cronies in Manila... the "news" spreads, : "RELIGIOUS WAR BREAKS OUT IN MAGUINDANAO!"

Meanwhile, the people mourn the death of Datu Amil and speak of revenge. Alrashin will leave for Manila today in an effort to explain the true situation to the authorities and get support of reporters and civic groups. Fatimah questions whether his efforts will bear fruit - they argue once again over the matter before he departs... The townspeople hold a meeting. They want back their lands and they want to avenge the murder of Datu Amil... Can Alrashin bring back justice from Manila? Can the people wait that long? Do they want to? No! says the old woman Jamila. She points out to people that there has never been a time when the Manila government has actively defended the rights of the Muslim people or the poor. The people agree. They must not be afraid to fight back and rely on their own strength... the assistance they ask will not be from Manila, but from Ismail and the revolutionary fighters. A week passes before the opening of the last scene.

Many things have changed in the town - the people are organizing themselves with the help of the guerillas. They are planning how to pull down the fences and take back their lands. Fatimah is beginning to participate in the meetings. She and Ismail are again reunited - they share with each other experiences and lessons they have learned.

Alrashin has returned from Manila. He is emptyhanded and a bit ashamed of himself for being so naive. But the people welcome him back wholeheartedly because they realize that he like Datu Amil, has always been motivated by a genuine desire to serve the cause of the Muslim people.

The townspeople continue their meeting as Abraham steps forward again to speak to the audience. He reminds us that this struggle of the Muslim Filipinos is actually being waged fiercely today throughout Mindanao... the whole cast stands and faces the audience.

They point out that so long as the people live with poverty and injustice, exploitation and oppression... the struggle will continue. Not only among the Muslim masses but also throughout the Philippines.

The struggle will be difficult... there will be set-backs and twists and turns... but so long as the people are determined to continue to struggle - final victory is theirs... is ours.

MUSLIM HISTORY



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by Felix Razon

Who are the Muslims?

Constituting the largest non-Christian ethnic group in the Philippines, the Filipino Muslims total over 3½ million people. There are nine distinct communities of unequal size concentrated in the Sulu archipelago and the western provinces of Mindanao. These are the Maguindanao of Cotabato (550,000), the Maranao of the Lake Lanao region (450,000), the Tausug of the Sulu archipelago (175,000) and the Samal of Southern Sulu (160,000). Other minor groups are the Yakan (with marked Polynesian features), Jama Mapun, Sangil, Melebuganon and Badjao ("Sea Gypsies" who live in the houseboats).

The Muslims show physical features similar to the Christianized Malayo-Polynesian stock to which the Filipinos belong. Although each group has its own language, all these languages belong to the same Filipino subgroups as the languages of the Visayan Islands (Cebuano, Hiligaynon, etc.) and southern Lzon (Tagalog).

Historical Outline

In the 14th century Arab traders introduced the Muslim religion into the Malay Peninsula and Borneo. Refugees and the influx of settlers led to the growth of Islam throughout the 14th and 15th centuries, beginning with the conversion of the Tausugs of Sulu. In Sulu the Muslim immigrant rulers established political stratification based on territorial rule. Sultans amassed power through local leaders engaged in the primary pursuits of trading and piracy in the islands to the south and to the north, which prevailed from the 16th up to the 19th century.

The Samal Muslims from the Malay Peninsula moved to Mindanao and formed a sultanate in the Cotabato River region. They vigorously converted the settlers there during the 15th and 16th centuries. Their motive of occupying land for trade bases and tribute carried them as far as the Visayas and the Manila Bay area where the Spanish conquistador Legaspi, after devious negotiations with local datus, defeated the resisting Sultan of Manila in 1570. The Muslims propagated their alphabet and cultivated the sciences and arts associated with their Arabic heritage.

The military conquests of the islands by the Muslims were checked by the superior military and political organization of the Spanish colonizing power, although the Muslims never actually became Spanish subjects until Governor Urbiztondo, in 1851, mounted a massive attack on Jolo and forced Sultan Mohammed Pulalun and his datus to sign a treaty (30 April 1851) in which Sulu and its dependencies became an integral part of the Philippines under the sovereignty of Spain. In 1876, the Spaniards attacked Jolo again and forced Sultan Mohammed Jamalul Alam to swear allegiance to Spain in 1879.

Throughout the Spanish colonial period, Spanish military expeditions manned chiefly by Filipino Christians attacked Muslims on the Zamboanga peninsula in 1596, 1611, 1628, 1630, 1637, 1638, without achieving any permanent victory. The Spaniards established Fort Pilar (Zamboanga City) in 1636, abandoned it in 1662, and re-established it in 1719. Christian enclaves at Dapitan and Zamboanga were surrounded by Muslims. The Muslims of Lake Lanao and Cotabato River regions successfully resisted the Spaniards. For 300 years, all inland Maranao sultanates were free and independent — until American hegemony in 1914.

During Spanish times, the technique of "divide and rule" was applied to foil united resistance by the natives against

Integration Through Assimilation?

Since 1901 when the American imperialists established the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes to 1957 when the Office of the Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu (created in 1935 during the Commonwealth) was transformed into the Commission on National Integration, the national government conceived the "Moro" problem as one in which the Muslims' animosity toward the majority of Christians must be minimized so that they, the ethnic minority, can be permanently integrated into the national structure. Of course, history confirms the fact that Filipino Christians were used by the Spaniards and the Americans in their campaign of exterminating the Muslims, hence Muslims have every reason to suspect the Christian Filipinos of betrayal and Messianic delusion. Research has shown that practically no headway has been made after more than 3 centuries in converting Muslims to Christianity. While the monetary culture (the market system), technology, industry, and formal education may have changed some habits of Muslims, their essential values and religious institutions appear as strong as ever, prompting even a Muslim representative in Congress in 1961 to introduce a bill calling for the independence of the Muslim provinces.

U.S. trained sociologists explain Muslim separatism as a product of the Muslims' close traditional religious, cultural and commercial ties with Borneo and Indonesia, a result of limited contact with other Filipinos and Western education. This is incredible. Fulbright scholars fresh from the U.S. analyze the problem as a result of the Muslim's alienation from the national government due to the failure of the government to cooperate with Muslim leaders in improving the living conditions of Filipino Muslims. Cooperation and mutual trust are supposed to be occurring in mixed organizations, such as Parent-Teachers Associations, Chambers of Commerce, Rotary and Lions Clubs (See *Area Handbook for the Philippines*, Washington, D.C., 1969, pp. 58-59).

Internal Contradictions

Especially after World War II, Mindanao experienced one of the most rapid increases in population, from 2.5 million in 1948 to 5.5 million in 1963. As a result most farmland was occupied. In the early 1970s there was no longer any accessible land that could be cultivated for new settlers. Most public lands have been leased under nominal rent to American private corporations. For example, the Philippine Packing Corporation (subsidiary of California Packing Corporation, producer of Del Monte canned goods) uses 16,000 hectares of public agricultural land, while Dole Philippines owns at least 10,000 hectares. Many more U.S. and Japanese corporations have appropriated public lands through manipulating the corrupt Marcos agencies, or working through the business empires of Elizalde, Soriano, Zobel, Lopez, etc. Plantations, logging concessions, and mines now intensely exploit the labor of Muslims and Christians alike, exhausting the natural resources that should have benefited the inhabitants.

Mindanao has an area of 36,537 square miles. Surigao on the northeastern coast is rich in mineral ores (nickel, chrome, copper, etc.). The eastern coast from the northern tip to the southern part is a heavily wooded range now being gradually denuded by rapacious loggers (dummies of

Dole BANANAS & Dole PINEAPPLE PRODUCTS FOR THE WORLD MARKETS



In the island of Mindanao, southern Philippines, lies an expanse of cultivated lands from where Dole products for the world markets come. Fresh Hawaiian Variety Pineapple. Canned Pineapple Products. Cavendish Bananas. All sporting the world-famous Dole brand.

Japanese interests) who become millionaires overnight.

West of the eastern range is the Agusan River Valley, well suited for agriculture. The soil around Lake Lanao, habitat of Maranaws, is fertile and is under intense cultivation. To the southwest is the Cotabato lowland drained by the Mindanao River. It is largely swampy. Its immense agricultural potential remains untapped. To the west of Lake Lanao is the mountainous Zamboanga peninsula. The Sulu archipelago is composed of numerous small islands of volcanic origin, totally 1,600 square miles in all. Because of historical and political circumstances, these islands possess no significant farming area or mining activity at all.

Comprising nearly 1/5 of the land area of the Philippines. Mindanao especially after World War II served as a major resettlement area, with vast tracts of uncultivated land and unharnessed natural resources. The water-power resources of Lake Lanao and the Maria Cristina Falls are just now being utilized. The hydroelectric plant is capable of yielding about 400,000 kilowatt capacity, sufficient to supply the needs of the Iligan City Integrated Steel Mill (now confiscated by the Marcos regime). Exploitation of extensive iron and oil deposits are being conducted by American and Japanese corporations encouraged by partnership with Marcos' operatives. Other mineral resources include copper, gold, coal and oil. Pineapples are grown in the huge Dole and Del Monte plantations. Abaca, logging, and other commercial crops have been the preserve of Filipino compradors (mostly of Chinese descent, or Chinese Kuomintang citizens) capitalized by Japanese, American and other foreign investors.

The primary contradiction in the Muslim areas is that between big feudal landlords and the masses of peasants, farmers and rural workers. Here are some figures:

In Lanao del Norte (1960 population, 270,603) has a density per square mile of cultivated area of 842. It has 56 landlords: 30 holding 50-99 hectares, 21 with 100-199 hectares, 2 with 200-499 hectares, and 3 with 500-999 hectares (1 hectare = 2.47 acres).

Zamboanga del Norte has a population of 281,429 and a density per square mile of cultivated area of 609. It has 356 landlords: 80 with 50-99 hectares, 19 with 100-199 hectares, 5 with 200-499 hectares, 7 with 500-999 hectares, and 2 with more than 1,000 hectares.

Sulu has the most explosive feudal problem. With 326,989 people, it has a density per sq. mile of cultivated area of 1,048. It has 118 landlords, 86 holding 50-99 hectares, 19 with 100-199 hectares, 8 with 200-499 hectares, 4 with 500-999 hectares, and 1 with over 1,000 hectares.

All in all, Mindanao has 2,171 landlords owning more than 50 to 1000+ hectares.

The concentration of big landlords may be found in Zamboanga del Norte, Northern Cotabato, Bukidnon, Agusan, Davao del Norte, Sargao del Norte, and Sulu. Lanao del Sur, Sulu, Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Suriago del Norte, Agusan, Davao and Zamboanga del Norte have the highest density of people per square mile of cultivated area. Given the concentration of landholdings in these areas and the lack of industry or employment for idle manpower except for the smuggling business, plus cultural conflicts and religious tensions arising from basic unsatisfied wants and needs, there exists an objective revolutionary situation in the Muslim provinces.

Class Struggle in Southern Philippines

Take the case of Cotabato. For many years a part of the Sultanate of Maguindanao, the province was never completely subjugated by the Spaniards, Americans, and Filipino Christians. Through the cooperation of Datu Piang and other Muslim leaders, the American colonialists succeeded in opening the area to sporadic waves of migration before and after World War II. As of 1948, there were 230,470 Christians, 155,162 Muslims, 39,631 pagans, 1,735 Chinese, and 56 Americans and Europeans. In the fifties and sixties, a heavy influx of Christian settlers from Cebu, Capiz, Iloilo and Bohol have virtually wiped out the myth of the "virgin frontier." In part this myth was propagated by American and Japanese speculators whose demand for laborers in their plantations and industries could not be satisfied by the local supply. In part, it was also an attempt by local merchants to expand the internal market. The Huk resettlement project under EDCOR during the Magsaysay regime built up the province as a haven for landless dissidents who have surrendered to the government.

What exactly is the character of the social relations that now prevail in Cotabato?

We can grasp the pattern of social relations if we can define the modes and levels of production in which the inhabitants there engage for their livelihood. The majority of Muslims, plus a sprinkling of mountain tribesmen, work primarily as regular farm laborers, tenants, and occasional hired hands. They comprise about 65-70% of the Cotabato population. There are few independent small farmers, usually Christians, while the big landlords number among them Muslim datos, Chinese mestizos, Spaniards and Americans (about 1%). Agricultural processing is in the hands of the Chinese who are merchants, bankers, etc. They control most of the business and trade in the urban areas. Christian Filipinos belong largely to a petty bourgeois stratum which predominate in barbershops, drug stores, local national agencies (e.g., insurance), government offices,

and other professional activities (teachers, clerks, etc.). The Chinese merchants comprise roughly 4% and the petty bourgeoisie about 5%. (See tables 1, 2, 3).

To earn their means of livelihood, the Muslims are confined to farm labor, fishing, dockwork (stevedores), handicrafts, etc. A small percentage of Muslims operate



goldsmith shops, restaurants, lodging houses catering to Muslims, and river transportation. Muslim workers comprise 20-25% of the total population.

Occupational distribution of Cotabato residents indicates that the Muslims are mostly limited to agricultural pursuits, with the datu maintaining control over large landholdings together with Christian mestizos and other aliens. Competition goes on between Muslims and Christians in agriculture, between Christians and Chinese and Americans in business and industry. Christian Filipinos practically monopolize government jobs and professional opportunities (doctors, lawyers, etc.) while the Chinese monopolize the retail and wholesale merchandising.

Although the Muslim upper class (a tiny sector) are beginning to enter business and the professions, a marked imbalance still exists in the proportion of school teaching personnel. Of 1600 educators, 1546 are Christian Filipinos, 37 Muslims (among 155,162 Muslims), 15 Tirurays, and one each of Bagobos and Manobos. Historically, the mountain tribesmen have been treated by Muslims and Christians alike as an inferior group who are then subjected to raids, slavery, seizure of their lands (for example, by Marcos through such government agencies like Elizalde's PANAMIN), and other types of exploitation. Hence these Tirurays, Bilaans, Manobos and Bagobos, together with the bulk of the Muslim people, belong to the militant revolutionary rural proletariat.

The land question remains the basic issue, the core of the social problem, in Cotabato. Claiming the right to most lands, including uncultivated areas, by virtue of being the original settlers. Muslims have resented the "legal" occupation and settlement of many areas in Mindanao by Filipino Christians and American corporations.

For the Muslim farmer, the land he cultivates is owned by the clan over which the datu presides. There is then no idea of "private property of land" and the fact does not exist for the majority of the Muslim peasants who, of course, are doubly victimized by feudal land tenure arrangements under the datu landlord and the puppet government that approves of such unjust practices. To counter the appropriation of their lands by individual title holders, the Muslims refuse to leave their homes, preferring to be called "squatters," demanding payments in lieu of their traditional rights to the land. Of course, the law drives them to desperate rebellion and armed resistance.

American commentators and social scientists argue that because the Muslims engaged in barter, obey the datu, and refuse to abide by the law courts, they are unable to compete with other social groups familiar with money, law, and individual ownership of land. But what has a presumably democratic government done to institute

equitable arrangements? None. Instead, the ruling class and its U.S. backer gain enormous profits from the status quo in Cotabato, in the whole of Mindanao and Sulu.

The Mystification of the Problem

In 1972 the Libyan Premier Col. Khadafi threatened the Marcos government that unless the systematic extermination of the Muslims did not cease, he would send arms, volunteers and money to them. Grabbing this opportunity, Marcos blamed "foreign powers" in stirring up unrest and precipitating the Muslim crisis. But Marcos and his military whiz kids could not just ignore reality, as evidenced by his frantic military operations last November and December and his nervous machinations in cajoling Muslim datu, politicians and other local leaders this January.

Far more subtle than this mystification of the situation in Mindanao is the conception that the conflict between Christians and Muslims is part of a religious war (*jihad*), a product purely and simply of religious differences. Religion by itself is already an illusion fostered by the oppressors to mislead the oppressed. A religious war easily confuses the participants whose fanaticism is channeled, by a policy of divide-and-rule, to other oppressed groups instead of against the oppressors. It is clear to many Filipinos, however, that the struggle for economic power underlies all the political and religious tensions in Mindanao.

Dr. Cesar Adib Majul, chairman of the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines, writes in his paper "The Muslims in the Philippines and the Present Mindanao Crisis":

Whereas some observers have emphasized that the problem in the South is essentially a matter of land dispute, others have blamed the whole thing on a conflict of leaders who in the struggle for political power have capitalized on the support of their followers. This latter view must not be rejected outright.

The problem in Mindanao is multi-faceted. Muslim traditional leaders depend, to a large extent, on traditional loyalty and institutions to maintain their power. Their strength, in the long run, will depend on composition of the population where they had exercised their leadership will naturally affect their position for the simple reason that Christian settlers will naturally elect Christian leaders. It is therefore to the advantages of Christian politicians to have more Christian settlers, provided the latter are made conscious of their dissimilarities to the Muslims. Here religious consciousness is capitalized on as an element serving the political motives of politicians. Eventually the sufferer is the ordinary Christian and Muslim. (*Graphic*, July 12, 1972)

It follows from this premise that the killing of Muslims and the methodical attempt to transform them into refugees form part of the Christian conspicy. Geological surveys have indicated that Cotabato and Lanao are provinces rich in gold and mineral ore. Hence, it is necessary to depopulate these areas so that U.S. corporations and their Filipino dummies can cash in. But before this capitalist exploitation can be inflicted, certain political maneuverings must be



the colonial ruler. Filipino Christians left alone to defend themselves from Muslim pirates, developed traditional hostility to the Muslims. Spanish education was not extended to Sulu, allowing polygamy, slavery and other feudal practices to continue.

In May 1899, American troops occupied Jolo and in December of the same year invaded Zamboanga. The United States employed its dual imperialistic tactics of fraud and violence, deceit and massacre. During the campaign to suppress the Muslims, the following American generals distinguished themselves for their ruthless terrorism and barbarity: Generals Leonard Wood, Tasker H. Bliss, John J. Pershing, Samuel S. Sumner, Frank McCoy, George W. Davis, and Frank D. Baldwin. To say the least, the Muslim leaders who died combatting American colonial oppression – Datu Ali (1905), Datu Jakiri (1909), Nakib Amil and Jami (1913), Saipul, Punglu and Salihudin (1914) – had no gratitude for the Yankee mercenaries.

History records the most bloody massacres committed by the Americans: the Battle of Bud Dajo in March 1906, in which more than 600 Muslim warriors, women and children were slaughtered; and the Battle of Mt. Bagsak, near Jolo, in June 1913, in which about 300 Muslims were slain by crazed American soldiers. (See *Report of the Philippine Commission*), Washington, D.C. Part I, pp. 349ff, and also the *Report* for 1913, pp. 16ff; W. Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, N.Y. 1928, II, p. 36.) Finally, when military suppression failed, the American civil governor of Mindanao and Sulu Frank W. Carpenter changed tactics and succeeded in bribing the datus with promises of material rewards, etc. In 1915 an agreement was concluded with Sultan Jamalul Kiram of Jolo, whereby the sultan renounced all temporal power for the sake of a life pension and a grant of land, aside from the consolation prize of being recognized as the spiritual head of all Filipino Muslims. Two treaties preceded this agreement: Wilkes Treaty of 1842 and the Bates Treaty of 1899.

Epic Resistance Against Colonialism

Historians generally consider the long sequence of futile attempts of the Spaniards to conquer and enslave the Muslims through military and missionary expeditions as proof of the cohesive organization, martial valor, and love of liberty of the Muslim people. Of course, the sultans and datus had no use for submitting to the power and authority of the colonizers if they can independently maintain their exploitation of the Muslims, pagan tribes, and Christian settlers. nless, of course, there was some profit or material advantage which outweighed vassalage.

In retaliation for Spanish bombarding of their forts and towns and the vicious depredations that followed, the Muslims pillaged coastal settlements in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. They captured hundreds of defenseless natives who were sold to the slave markets of Borneo and the East Indies. These raids depopulated the fringes of the colony, resulting partly in the neglect of agriculture and trade in many areas.

It was the Spanish invasion of Jolo in June 1587 which sparked the systematic plan of Muslim retaliation, among which can be cited the following: In July 1599, the chieftains Sali and Silonga gathered a fleet of 50 boats and 3,000 men and raided the coastal towns of Panay, Negros

and Cebu. In 1636, Tagal, a fiery brother of Sultan Kudarat of Magindanaw, prowled Visayan waters and plundered the pueblos of Mindoro, Albay, Camarines, Tayabes, Mariveles, and the city of Manila. According to Spanish records (Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, Vol. II, pp. 26ff.), the Muslims captured an average of 500 persons a year who were sold as slaves in Sandakan, Celebes, Batavia, and other markets in the East Indies.

In May 1823, Muslims raided the Visayan province and captured about a dozen notables, among them the Provincial of the Recollect Order and another friar, who were ransomed for 10,000 pesos. (See Montero y Vidal, *Historia General de Filipinas*, II, 482-83).

Between 1828 and 1836, about 6,000 persons were estimated to have been carried away by the raiders. Ferdinand Blumentritt (in his book *Filipinas, ataque de los Holandeses*, 1882) relates how after the Dutch failed to establish a factory at Sarangani Islands (southwest of Mindanao), they resigned themselves to giving arms and ammunition to the Muslims in exchange for kidnapped Christians who were brought to become slave-laborers in their Indonesian plantations. It is clear that the Dutch merchants and landlords, with the collusion of the Dutch colonial government, fostered slave-trading and sustained the economic rationale for piracy.

One should not omit the barbarous massacres and savage treatment of the Muslims committed by the Spanish colonialists. It is enough to mention 16 punitive expeditions to Jolo from 1578 to 1876. Gov. Hurtado Corcuera's genocidal campaigns against Sultan Kudarat of Lanao in 1639 and against Sultan Bungsu in Jolo in 1638 stand out as crying evidence of Spanish "benevolence." In 1848, Gov. Narciso Claveria killed over 450 Muslims and captured over 200 prisoners. In 1849, Gov. Urbiztondo routed the Sultan's forces in Jolo, annihilating more than 389 Moslems. With a fleet of modern steamboats, Admiral Malcampo on Feb. 29, 1876, bombarded Jolo and killed thousands.

One important fact to be noted in these campaigns is the overwhelming presence of Filipinos from Luzon and the Visayas. For example, in the first attempt to colonize Mindanao in 1596, the Spanish expedition numbered 1500 Filipinos, 214 Spaniards and 2 Jesuits (Morga, *Sucesos*, 1609). In 1628-29, another punitive sortie departed in 70 vessels, with 2,000 Filipinos and 350 Spaniards. In the campaign in Lanao in 1639, there were 500 Filipinos and only 50 Spaniards under the command of the racist hangman, Recollect missionary-soldier Father Augustin de San Pedro. In 1640, there were 500 Boholanos and 50 Spaniards.

In sum, the proportion was on the average 4 or 5 Filipinos (*Indios*, as the Spaniards called the inhabitants then) for every Spaniard – a clear proof of the colonialist technique of "divide and rule," pitting natives or tribes against one another. No wonder the Muslims today distrust other Filipinos, suspecting Christians of criminal motives. No wonder the Christian Filipinos today have grown up to consider the Muslims as bandits, pirates, maniacs, etc. Such is the product of 350 years of colonial domination and neocolonial servility.

Unable to establish any commercial foothold in Mindanao and Sulu because of a self-defeating mercantilist

policy which drove away British, French and Dutch traders, the Spaniards failed to offer the Muslims any viable means of livelihood under Spanish hegemony. The attempt to increase production through agriculture, handicrafts, mining, etc. were not even attempted after the building of forts in Zamboanga, Jolo, Basilan, etc. Chained to the datu system which paralyzed agriculture at a primitive stage and stunted the labor potential of Muslim artisans, fishermen, and others, the vast majority of Muslims were driven to piracy; smuggling, banditry, and other uncertain parasitic forms of livelihood. They constituted the lumpen stratum in the over-all structure of colonial society.

While the Muslims' vindictive reprisals earned them incidental commercial profits for the slave trade and the looting of property from churches, etc., it was primarily for the sake of defending their lives, homes, cultural and religious freedoms and independence that they were compelled by the means available then to thwart the Spaniards and prove to would-be invaders that while they may be killed they will not be defeated. The Muslims on the whole succeeded in impressing on Spaniards, Americans and Filipino class oppressors alike that they could not be enslaved without unrelenting resistance on their part.

So long as smuggling and traffic of high-valued cargo (guns, narcotics, etc.) and the illicit entry of aliens remain profitable, the Sulu Muslims with their motorized vintas and high-speed *kumpits* will continue to defy government regulations. For gun-control and law-enforcement – which means “profit-sharing” with the syndicate of Marcos-controlled oligarchs, corrupt politicians, bureaucrats, police and army officers – will not solve the poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, hunger, rampant diseases, and resultant anger prevailing in Mindanao and Sulu. Nor will they satisfy the intense aspirations of the Muslims for economic and cultural integrity, social justice and material prosperity.

The Traditional Ethos

Owing to its low level and undeveloped mode of production, the early Muslim communities were politically organized into independent principalities ruled by sultans. These principalities ranged in size from a unit composed of a few villages to the Sultanate of Sulu which included Sulu and parts of Borneo, southern Palawan and Mindanao.

The Sultan acts as the secular and ecclesiastical leader. His authority stems from the Koran. This is a form of theocratic rule common to societies where slave labor provided the major share of the wealth gained from primitive cultivation, trade by barter, and especially raids and plunder. Taxes were levied as religious tithes, and fines were exacted for violation of religious laws, customs, and taboos. Under the sultan were the religious advisers (*kadis*) and the teacher-priests (*imams*).

But the real power was exercised by the local leaders, the *datu*s. Based on their wealth and the prestige of their clan, the *datu* accumulated power through extending the privilege of protection to as many people who would acknowledge his leadership. The traditional role of the *datu* then was to treat his subjects as vassals, giving emergency aid, food for festivals, physical safety for his subjects, etc. In return, the subjects paid tribute in the form of money of labor—hence, a feudal system of social relations prevailed.



The social organization of the Islamic sultanates of Sulu and Mindanao was based on direct land ownership by the sultans and *datu*s and also on their function as administrators of communal lands. This privileged class of the nobility exacted land rent concealed in the form of religious tribute, thus exploiting the toiling masses. This landlord class, with the help of religious teachers, scribes and a standing armed force, manipulated the culture, customs, laws, religious precepts, and other ideological means to promote its material advantages and to maintain its domination.

One will recall that in the two centuries before the Spanish colonialists came, the sultanates acquired and consolidated their power through force. They rode the third wave of Malay migrants whom they tried by force and cunning to subjugate, buying them out, enslaving them or driving out the original non-Muslim inhabitants and other migrants of the areas where they chose to settle. Two classes of working people – slaves and serfs – arose which the Islamic ruling class used to clear the forests and till the fields. But in essence, the mode of land-use remained primitive because of the restrictive social relations. The resort to plunder and slave-trading, which were the chief sources of wealth to the ruling class, also prevented the rise of such progressive elements as merchants, handicraftsmen oriented to the market, and other small-scale commodity producers, perpetuating the semi-slave and semi-feudal structure of the community.

The *datu* formed part of a hereditary upper class who dominated the system of courts (*agama*) which enforced customary laws. These courts are actually councils of the clan, thus preventing even wealthy outsiders to intrude. It is said that the process of American “pacification” or suppression of the Muslims destroyed the power, if not the



prestige, of the sultans. However, the datos continue to wield power through the courts. With the help of religious sanctions and traditions, the datos are able to preserve their wealth (land, tools, animals, other property) and influence. They sustain the personal loyalty of their followers through influence-peddling in government, providing jobs and other benefits. If a datu fails to provide protection and aid, his followers may shift allegiance to other datos whose political machinery based on economic power can attend to the needs of their subjects. The government accepts and preserves this status quo in the Muslim areas by working through the local datos, abandoning all the bogus rhetoric of democracy, equality, social justice, etc. that the puppet/neocolonial administration has been programmed to dish out.

History indicates that the Muslims acquired slaves through raids on Christian settlements, rulings of the *agama* courts, direct purchase, progeny of slaves, and through people in debt selling themselves to the wealthy. This occurs in a system where the labor power of slaves subverts a primitive method of land use, with domestic slavery more prevalent than chattel slavery. Slaves after all could belong only to the hereditary aristocracy, the sultans and datos; they were treated as servants, but received no pay. While slavery has been outlawed in 1968, certain regions in Lanao still have *agama* courts which can sentence someone to slavery in which the person can be sold to someone else. People in debt can also be considered slaves to their debtors, with their children inheriting their parents' status.

We have pointed out the fact that Muslim society, its values and institutions, is largely determined by its material

foundation. The persistence of slavery results from the condemnation of Muslims to a semi-feudal state of producing their means of existence. Aside from the narrow family loyalty common to stagnant rural societies, the datu system justified by the Koran and customary laws is essentially an exploitative system that needs to be wiped out to liberate the vast potential of the masses.

Consider how in exchange for patronage and services like financial services (slowly being replaced by banks and rural credit facilities), the datu collects tribute from his subjects: 10% of the harvest of the farmer, even if the farmer owns his land.

In face of the condescending and paternal attitude of the national government toward such practices as slavery polygamy and divorce among Muslims, institutions sanctioned by custom and religion, we discover that appearances hide the reality. Data show that only 2% of Muslim husbands, especially the wealthy class, practice polygamy. Divorce has been allowed by special law, without any concern for the plight of women and children. There is also much interest shown in the Muslim idea of "face" or personal esteem (*maratabat*), comparable to the fashionable sociological jargon of "interpersonal relations" (SIR), shame complex (*hiya*), etc. Everyone knows that these psychological manifestations reflect the material conditions of social existence, and only in defining the causes of those manifestations in actual reality can we understand and judge their real meaning and import.

Sketch of the Production Relations

To understand the social structure, culture and other social forms of consciousness in Muslim society, it is necessary to describe the dominant mode of production and the social organization of labor in which members of the various Muslim groups participate. What is attempted here is simply a framework for understanding the role of the Muslim struggle for the right of self-determination within the present struggle of all Filipinos for national democracy, against U.S. imperialism and the Christian chauvinism of the lackeys in the present dictatorship.

History has shown that the Muslims have been traditionally engaged in two forms of production: farming and trading, with fishing as a source of livelihood for many Muslims in Sulu.

The Maranaws who are concentrated in the province of Lanao del Sur are comprised of a quarter of a million farmers living within 3 miles of the shores of Lake Lanao. Their main urban-cultural center is Marawi City at the northern edge of the lake. Farming in the most fertile lands has continued as the single most important economic pursuit, followed by cottage industries producing metal and wood handicrafts. These handicraft items now supply the public markets and shops in Marawi. In the city we find the recently founded State University of Mindanao and new mosques which presumably indicate a resurgence of Islam amid the growing sentiment for Muslim independence.

Owing to a less centralized and unified pattern of landholding, the Maranaws are more divided than other Muslim groups. The more widespread practice of trade and commerce underlies the breaking up of the Maranaws into numerous small sultanates and principalities which had successfully resisted the imposition of Western culture.

Only 8 percent of the population in Lanao del Sur speak English. Faced with a common enemy, however, these *datus* have cooperated and joined forces in the past.

Like the Maranaws, the Maguindanaws also derive their means of support from farming. They are inland dwellers and lowland rice farmers who live along the shores and flood plains of the Cotabato River. Other occupations aside from the traditional metalworking are ownership of restaurants and hotels that serve a Muslim clientele and management of river transportation.

The land among the Maguindanaws is considered clan territory controlled by local *datus*. Individual farmers do not legally own parcels of land, but the farmers function as serfs who work sections of the land and appropriate the harvests. It is not clear whether the *datu* shares in the harvest, for local arrangements vary. It is certain, however, that the farmers perform labor for the *datu* as part of the traditional system of reciprocal obligation. In theory, outsiders cannot buy land belonging to the clan. This kind of communal ownership of land ties the individual farmer to the land as a serf, subservient to the dictates of the *datu*, and at the mercy of the uncontrollable natural forces that determine the productivity of his labor. Such productivity, as in all feudal systems, is fixed at a minimal and primitive level in supporting a parasitic (non-productive) ruling class.

When Christian settlers from the Visayas, Ilocos and Huk surrenderees from Luzon came to Cotabato and gained numerical supremacy, the Western contractual system of land ownership sharpened the class conflicts between Muslim serfs and *datus* on the one hand, and Christian farmers on the other. While the Maguindanaws still control the best agricultural lands, the Christians by legal trickery or terrorism, are driving out the Muslims from their traditional fields, compelling the aggrieved Muslims to retaliate by using arms. The *datus* and other Muslims experienced in landgrabbing also victimize Muslims, Christians and pagans in the mad scramble for means or instruments of production. In the city of Cotabato, the Christians who are educated in Western schools monopolize most employment opportunities and professions, so that class divisions are well-defined and tensions erupt into violence.

The Tausug and the Samals who inhabit the Sulu Islands differ from the Maranaws and Maguindanaws in that their means and mode of producing their subsistence do not depend chiefly on land. The Tausug, mainly located in the Jolo island cluster, grow coconuts, fruits, cassava, yams and upland rice in limited quantities that furnish the local markets. Income is largely derived from trade (legal and illegal), fishing, handicrafts in wood, metal and textiles. Sulu mats and baskets enjoy a universally good reputation.


The Samal Muslims live mainly on the coasts of the Tawi-Tawi island cluster. In contrast to the aggressive and solidly organized Tausug (which prides itself in being the first indigenous group that was Islamized by Makdum, an Arabian judge or scholar, in 1380), the Samals are said to view the Tausugs with fear and admiration. The primary occupation of the Samals are trading, fishing, and boatbuilding.


Given the precarious condition of livelihood of the Sulu Muslims, a stronger sense of kinship solidarity has prevailed to insure that wealth or property is kept within joint

households. Thus marriages are carefully arranged. Married children live in close proximity to their parents. Sibling ties, ranked according to age, influence the codes of behavior. The male child is highly valued. Generally the husband acts as the family provider. Individuals conduct themselves according to the norms of loyalty and mutual obligation with the kinship group of both parents. Consequently, disputes among individuals become disputes between kin groups, involving relatives for generations. Especially among the Tausug, bearing weapons is identified with masculinity and required by the exigencies of family feuds which are often settled by physical violence. While a feeling of loyalty may be extended to neighbors based on similar occupation and class, kinship transcends all other interpersonal considerations.

We know from history that Jolo has been attacked and destroyed several times by the Spaniards, intensifying the fierce spirit of resistance of the Muslim inhabitants against alien colonizers. Exposed to such recurrent threats of annihilation and dependent on uncertain means of livelihood — trading, piracy, merchandising of slaves, etc. — the presence of organized dissidents becomes partly explicable. The government calls this rebellion against exploiters, Christian chauvinists, and other evil gentry as “banditry.” Smuggling is today generally considered the primary source of income for most people in Sulu. This of course violates customs laws and completely disregards restriction of tariff boundaries, immigration regulations and other government requirements. But this pattern has been fostered by government officials, mostly *datus* and their henchmen, who share in the profits of smuggling. The Philippine Constabulary and Philippine Marines also take their cut, preying on small-time smugglers and extorting levies and taxes of all sorts.

Jolo serves as a kind of entrepot for smugglers, an urban market-center in which the Christian 15 percent of the population dominates associations like the Jolo Jaycees and Jolo Lions Club. The social structure still rests on a traditional rural base, with the tiny elite stratum dependent on land control. Muslims able to get an education (usually attached to the *datu* clan) enter the respected professions or government services, thus reinforcing the exploitative apparatus. There is a lively trade in rice-bran, copra, sugar, seashells, crocodile hides, kapok and coconuts in exchange for perfumes, cigarettes, wines, liquors, tapestries and sarongs. But this is negligible compared to other smuggled goods from Borneo and Indonesia: narcotics, guns, electronics, photographic equipment, diamonds, watches, and more expensive commodities.





(a family of tropical hardwoods) and other unprocessed timber for its booming wood industry, in particular plywood, and finished products like pianos, cabinets, panelling, etc., which enjoy a lucrative world market. Timber export constitutes one of the Philippines' top dollar earners.

Denudation of the country's public forests began rapidly after WW II when surplus U.S. portable sawmills, tractors, chainsaws, and other equipment were used to start the timber export industry. U.S. and Japanese financing capitalized the timber concessionaries, mostly corrupt bureaucrats and politicians, who drove Muslims and pagan mountain tribes (like the Tasadays) from their homesteads and farms, cutting down virgin forests of "old growth timber" (at least 25 years old). Government scientists have calculated that at the rate timber (and other mineral resources) are being extracted from Mindanao, in 20 years

the whole island would be a desert. It would take at least 100 years of uninterrupted growth for Philippine timber stands to return to 1953 levels, according to studies made by forest experts.

If we take Cotabato province alone, we shall discover how tremendously attractive the land, labor supply, and natural resources of this Muslim region are to U.S., Japanese, and local capitalist investors. Cotabato province, almost equal in land size to the whole of Central Luzon, contains an enormous potential for development involving forests, mineral ores, gold, oil, hydroelectric power, cattle ranching, plantations, and other industries. For this prospect of immense profits, U.S. imperialism would sacrifice the lives of millions of Muslims and Christian Filipinos, the humanity of the whole race even, unless it is destroyed by people's war.



THE JOLO MASSACRE

Reprinted from the *Philippines Information Bulletin* Vol II, No. 2, April 1974.

1. What Happened

The *Philippines Information Bulletin* has received an eye-witness account of the Jolo bombardment sent by a local resident. This reported that, according to reliable estimates, from 400 to 1,000 civilians were killed, mostly Muslims. Very revealing is the fact that in discussing military casualties, the report says, "The most reliable estimate has come from the JUSMAG sources in Manila and they think that 2 battalions were 'chewed up' in the fighting in Jolo Town." This matter-of-fact reference to the JUSMAG (Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group) as an authority suggests the interest which U.S. military advisors took in the Jolo affair, an interest the eye-witness seems to take for granted. Also noteworthy is the claim of the report that "Rebel leaders, in talks with eye-witnesses, have admitted that . . . they thought the military would never shell the town." The rebel leaders might have thought differently had they given more weight to the presence of Ambassador William H. Sullivan in Manila, and to the escalation of violence his policies brought to Vietnam and Laos.

Perhaps the best account of what happened at Jolo was the report of Joseph Lelyveld in the *New York Times* of February 23, which follows:

Jolo, the Philippines, Feb. 21 — Scanning a scene of devastation and ruin unlike any this country has seen since World War II, an old man remarked in English as rueful as if

was jagged, "Sorry this time because of this you see now."

He was standing in what had been the commercial center of a town of 40,000 people. Now it was acres of charred rubble and blasted concrete, from which bodies were still being recovered this morning, more than a week after the Philippine armed forces finally took Jolo back from Moslem insurgents.

The Government admits to more than 300 dead, giving a "body count" of 225 rebels, about 50 civilians and only 29 of its own troops. From what could be learned from survivors here today, it seemed reasonable to estimate the toll at nearly double the Government's figure but much lower than the 10,000 dead or missing mentioned in earlier reports.

An air force officer said that at least 100 Government troops had actually been killed so far in the fighting, which is continuing in the interior of Jolo Island, an outcropping of volcanic hills and coconut groves in the center of the Sulu Sea about 570 miles southwest of Manila.

The hospital administrator, Sauradjan Ibba, said he had been hearing estimates of 200 civilians killed, and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Jolo, the Most Rev. Philip Smith, a Bostonian, said he thought that a fair guess.

Clearly no one will ever know for sure. But even 200 would be a low figure, considering the heavy firepower poured into the town by army artillery, naval batteries firing from a few hundred yards offshore and an old tank used to keep the rebels from capturing the airstrip.

Outside the town, the Government has been using Sabre jets, aged C-47 gunships and armed helicopters, all supplied



by the United States, to strafe and bomb the rebel force, which is now estimated at about 1,500. In the last month the insurgents have managed to shoot down two jets and four helicopters.

One helicopter was shot down from the town plaza by members of the 90-man Jolo police force, all of whom defected to the rebels, along with the mayor, when the fighting started on Feb. 7. Two of the helicopters were hit two days ago, after official spokesmen had announced in Manila that the rebels were scattering and fleeing to the hills.

The Manila spokesmen have been dispensing accounts of the ferocity of the rebels and their disregard for human life. The Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, said in an interview that the rebels had raped nuns in Jolo, then added, "We don't want to make anything out of this."

The report, later broadcast, was disclaimed on all sides here and with special vehemence by the nuns. "Nothing has been hurt, nothing has been hit, nothing has been abducted, nothing has been molested," protested Sister Imaculata, who answered the door at the Carmelite convent.

According to another nun, Sister Marion Chipeco of the Good Shepherd Order, the rebels deserved praise for their pains to spare civilian lives. She said they had led the residents of the western end of town, where only a handful of buildings remain standing, to refuge away from the heaviest fighting. A resident named Bitay Milakhum, who was wearing an armband that identified him as "Senior deputy sheriff" of Jolo, said the air force later bombed those places. He said he had seen mass graves.

Aladjadi Amilottoh, a mathematics teacher in a local high school, took refuge with his family in a doctor's house on the edge of town the night of Feb. 7. There were no insurgents near the house, Mr. Amilottoh said this morning as he lay in the Sulu Public Hospital under a pink tablecloth that was serving as a blanket.

According to Mr. Amilottoh, the house was shelled by

an army battery and seven civilians, including his wife, his eldest daughter, two of his sons and his sister-in-law died.

Of his six surviving children, two were wounded, including a three-year-old daughter, whose left hand was torn off by shrapnel. She sat next to Mr. Amilottoh on his hospital bed as he spoke. He had lost his left arm.

"They only suspected there were rebels there but they were all evacuees," he said. Then, after a pause, he repeated himself, as if he needed to search for some sense in the words. "They just suspected it," he said.

Government spokesmen contend that the carnage in Jolo has not upset the conciliatory "policy of attraction" that has supposedly guided the handling of the Moslem insurgency since September. But experienced observers think it is bound to increase the mistrust in the Moslem areas of Sulu and Mindanao for a remote, unsympathetic, Christian Government in Manila.

Of the 40 million Filipinos, only 2.5 million are Moslems. Ten years ago, most lived in areas in which Moslems were in the majority and they enjoyed a measure of influence in Manila.

But Christian settlers, who view the Moslem areas as a Philippine frontier, now outnumber the Moslems in most places and there have been bitter struggles for land. With the introduction of martial law by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in September, 1972, the Moslems lost whatever leverage their votes had given them.

Assignment of blame for the outbreak on Jolo depends on who is telling the story and where he begins. It is clear that rebels managed to infiltrate the town of Jolo, starting about Feb. 4, and that, backed by the police, they staged a coordinated attack on military camps at opposite ends of the town in the early hours of Feb. 7.

But the armed forces had started a major military operation on Jolo Island late in January to regain towns the rebels had been occupying without challenge for several months. That operation apparently started the rebels

thinking of diversionary tactics in Jolo town.

Once the rebels started infiltrating the town, there were three armed groups there besides the Government troops — the infiltrators, a group of “returned” rebels who had been allowed to keep their weapons after surrendering to the Government, and the police, who apparently viewed these “returnees” as a threat to their authority.

It even appears that the Government dispensed arms to rebels who surrendered, making new weapons an inducement to change sides. The surrendered rebels were then enlisted in the Government’s operations against the remaining insurgents.

This divid-and-rule tactic was successful to an extent, but it pushed the police into the arms of the insurgents.

The official view is that the Moslem insurgency on Jolo has been taken over by “Maoists” and has thereby lost the support of the people, but there is no firm evidence that the insurgent leaders have told their followers anything about Mao Tse-tung or, indeed, that they have any ideological leanings that way.

A leader of the “returned” rebels now fighting with the army replied with a bewildered stare when he was asked about “Maoists” in the hills.

The insurgents tell their followers that they are fighting to prevent “genocide” against all Moslems in the Philippines. The Marcos Government, which relies upon Saudi Arabia and Iran for its oil supplies, is especially sensitive these days about such charges. That may be one reason the armed forces are now making “Maoist” their euphemism for Moslem rebel.

No more than 5,000 of Jolo’s population appeared to still be in the town today. Many of these were scavenging in the ruins. They appeared to be finding little of value, for the damage that was begun by shelling was completed on the afternoon of Feb. 8 by a fire that razed the center of the town.

The blaze could easily have been started by artillery fire, but military authorities insist it was begun by “Maoists” to cover their retreat. Other sources assert the army started it to burn the rebels out.

2. Oil and Jolo: Documentation

A. “Prior to martial law, 67 percent of the oil industry’s sales in the Philippines were controlled by American companies. Several of these companies had been attempting to obtain contracts for exploration in the Sulu Sea between the Philippines and Indonesia, but were blocked by the Philippine Congress.

“However, with Congress dissolved after martial law, Marcos granted \$63 million worth of exploration contracts, the last one Jan. 2 to Sun Oil for \$6.5 million.”

Charles Thomson, *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*,
January 22, 1974

B. “. . . now the Martial Law Administration has granted oil exploration rights to two local and two foreign companies. . . . The two foreign companies are Texaco International and Chevron Overseas Petroleum Incorporated, and the local companies are Abstract Mining and Industrial Corporation and Astro Minerals and Oil Corporation. . . .

“The area which will be explored is about 1.2 million hectares in the Sulu Sea area, adjacent to the Shell, Esso and French and Japanese concessions off Sabah. . . . The two foreign companies will invest U.S. \$8 million in the first two years of drilling with an affiliate, Caltex Philippines, providing backup facilities.”

Far Eastern Economic Review,
January 15, 1973

C. “. . . Why did the military suddenly launch the mopping-up operation? According to the scholars, the plausible explanation for the haste is the desire of the Marcos regime to expedite the search for oil in the Sulu Sea area. Of all the probable oil fields in Philippine territory, the Sulu Archipelago is considered the ‘most sure.’ In fact, one of the oil search firms is named Sulu Sea Oil Development Corp. with Italian financiers. The Italian investors are raring to start drilling, but the technicians are afraid of attacks from the Muslim rebels. The Marcos boys were in a hurry to assure the oil drillers that the peace and order situation in the area was well under control.”

Max T. Marquez, *The Philippine Times*,
February 28, 1974

D. “. . . Father Chalkey (Rev. Andrew Chalkey, OMI, a missionary in the Sulu archipelago) is . . . happy to confirm . . . the accuracy of my report that the search for oil is playing a major part in the Sulu fighting. He said President Marcos has been using the Navy and the Air Force in the feverish hunt for the black gold.”

Max T. Marquez, *The Philippine Times*,
March 15, 1974

E. “The army’s aim is genocide, to wipe out all Moros and take our homeland. . . . Because Sulu is rich. Oil in the sea, crops, prestige for President Marcos’ Manila Government.”

Benhur Dandan, Secretary of the Lupa Sug
(original name for Jolo) Revolutionary Council,
as quoted in an interview in the
Far Eastern Economic Review,
March 11, 1974

3. Sullivan and the Jusmag

Last July 9, when William H. Sullivan was up for appointment as Ambassador to the Philippines, Anthony Lewis of the *New York Times* wrote of him and McMurtrie Godley (both men having directed the U.S. bombing of Laos), “Sullivan and Godley have the blood of more innocent beings on their hands than just about anyone who has ever served as an American Foreign Service Officer.”

It is, perhaps, no accident that the destruction of Jolo, representing a notable escalation in the violence of Marcos’ counter-insurgency efforts, occurred before Sullivan had finished his first year as Ambassador to the Philippines. U.S. Ambassador Byroade, whom Sullivan succeeded, is reported to have said that the Muslim insurgency was beyond the capacity of the Marcos government to contain (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 26, 1973). But Sullivan has faced tough insurgent threats before. As a U.S. diplomatic official in Vietnam in 1963, he recommended



Amb. William H. Sullivan

the bombing of the North and the introduction of U.S. troops. In the following year in Laos, he inaugurated a massive aerial bombardment that killed civilians and combatants alike. Is Sullivan meeting a similar challenge in the Philippines by promoting similar escalation?

In Laos Sullivan worked directly with the U.S. Air Force whose men and planes did the bombing. At Jolo, on the other hand, it was the Philippine Armed Forces that wrought the destruction (using U.S.-supplied weapons). But there is an intermediary link between Ambassador Sullivan and the Philippine military, and that is the JUSMAG. Knowing Ambassador Sullivan's penchant for military solutions and his aggressive nature, it is difficult to believe that he does not work closely with the JUSMAG or that he does not make his influence felt in the deliberations of that body (whose interest in Jolo is attested to by the eyewitness account printed on page 3.)

Nor does Ambassador Sullivan have to rely on the JUSMAG alone to make his influence felt; he is supported, of course, by the members of his Embassy Staff, several of whom have had counter-insurgency experience in Vietnam and Laos.

4. Another Jolo Massacre – 68 Years Ago

On October 28, 1899 (six months after Dewey sank the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay), the *Philadelphia Ledger* reported that President William McKinley told a member of his cabinet that the United States would have to remain in the Philippines indefinitely because "the natural resources of the islands will attract large numbers of Americans who must be protected." So McKinley carried on a three-year war against Philippine nationalists to establish a U.S. colonial administration in the Philippines to protect U.S. investors from the Filipinos, who, McKinley said (with racist arrogance), were prone to theft and murder.

The Muslims of the southern Philippines resisted U.S. rule for a long time, and in 1906 General Leonard Wood, commanding a body of U.S. troops, wiped out one of the remaining centers of Muslim resistance at Mount Bud Dajo, near the town of Jolo, in the process exterminating 600 men, women and children. The dissident Muslims had taken

refuge with their families in the crater of an extinct volcano, and for one and a half days Wood, with artillery and troops encircling the crater rim, poured fire into the Muslims massed in the pit below. When it was all over, not a Muslim was left alive; all 600 were slaughtered.

This episode, known at the time as the "Moro Massacre" (since the U.S. troops called the Muslims "Moros"), drew forth anti-imperialist protest in the United States. Mark Twain scathingly referred to it as "incomparably the greatest victory that was ever achieved by the Christian soldiers of the United States" (see *Philippines Information Bulletin*, vol. 1, no. 3, June 1973). (The picture on this page shows General Leonard Wood, with face toward camera, at the volcano brink directing the operations at Bud Dajo.)

In 1946 the United States granted the Philippines independence. But for the masses of Filipino people this meant only that they exchanged a U.S. colonial administration for a government that was formally independent, but essentially subservient to U.S. economic and military domination.

Comparing the Jolo massacre of 1906 with that of 1974 exposes the fraud of present-day Philippine "independence," which the Marcos dictatorship has brought to the lowest depths of servility and degradation. In 1906 U.S. troops did the butchering at Jolo. Today Philippine troops, using U.S.-supplied weapons and under U.S. guidance, slaughter Muslims to protect U.S. investors. This is what is known variously as neo-colonialism, "Vietnamization," or the Nixon Doctrine, all for the benefit of multi-national corporations.

